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"UNDERSTANDING, AUTHORITY, AND
WILL": SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE
ELIZABETHAN ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
ALLEN DILLARD BOYER *
Bacon and Shakespeare: what they were to philosophy and litera
ture, Coke was to the common law. 	 •
J.H. Baker
I. INTRODUCTION
Of all important jurisprudents, Sir Edward Coke is the most infu-
riatingly conventional. Despite the drama which often attended his
career—his cross-examination of Sir Walter Raleigh, his role in uncov-
ering the Gunpowder Plot, his bitter rivalry with Sir Francis Bacon and
his explosive face-to-face confrontations with King James I—Coke's
work presents a studied calm.' Coke explains rather than critiques. He
describes and justifies existing legal rules rather than working out how
the law provides rules for making rules. He is a poet of judicial wisdom
and legal craftsmanship rather than a prophet of change. He feels that
what exists has lasted and is therefore to be trusted, and his work
sounds in practice rather than in theory.
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The common law, Coke wrote, represented "an artificial perfec-
tion of reason." The artifice was the skill of the practicing lawyer. The
perfection was the mastery achieved by judges in their generations—.
"an infinite series of grave and learned men." In short, in sum, law
represents the understandings of the legal community:
To take such a perspective can be treacherous. To define law by
the practices of lawyers comes perilously close to defining the ideal as
the norm, to making conventionality the test of law. Within the con-
ventional, however, there is a core of consensus which gives it mass and
power. Coke's definition of law as the lawyers' "artificial reason" privi-
leges agreement and shared understanding. To define law in this way
means dealing not only with doctrines and statutes, but also with
practices—how the law is put into action, and how it operates within
the legal profession and the broader society.
The locus classicus of Coke's definition of artificial reason is found
in his Commentary Upon Littleton. Here Coke wrote:
[R]eason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself is
nothing else but reason; which is to be understood of an
artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observa-
tion and experience, and not of every man's natural reason;
for Nemo nascitur artilex. This legal reason est summa ratio.
And therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so many
several heads, were united into one, yet could he not make
such a law as the law in England is; because by many succes-
sions of ages it hath been fined and refined by an infinite
number of grave and learned men, and by long experience
grown to such a perfection, for the government of this realm,
as the old rule may be justly verified of it, Neminem oportet esse
sapientiorem legibus: .
 No man out of his own private reason
ought to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of
reason.2
The themes sounded in this passage are central to Coke's jurispru-
dence. Artificial reason is not natural reason or simple native intel-
ligence. It is a skill to be acquired only by an apprentice steeped in
lawyers' conventions. Mastery of the law is an art rather than a
science. The law rests somewhat upon custom (that is, on its evolu-
2
 SIR EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 97b (Charles Butler ed., 18th ed., Legal
Classics Library 1985) (1628). Also known as the FIRST PART OF TIIE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
or ENGLAND, this work is hereinafter cited as Co. Lrrr., to continue the practice of thirty-seven
decades.
December 1997]	 SIR EDWARD COKE	 45
lion and acceptance over centuries) and somewhat upon reason
(upon the perfection achieved by centuries of study). Critically, the
law is valid because it reflects the judgment of "grave and learned
men"—the procession of sages and savants, the heroes of Coke's law
books.
Coke so trusted the wisdom of the judges that he ranked it above
the wisdom of the legislature, and sealed his faith with the witness of
his career. The modern doctrine of judicial review traces its origins to
the opinion Coke rendered in Bonham's Case (1610). 8 Much of the
vitality of this doctrine relates to the circumstances in which it was
reached. Acting as chief justice, Coke struck down a law he found
insupportable, and held to his decision against forceful opposition.
From this history emerged Marbury v. Madison' and two central
principles of constitutional law. The first of these is that the judges are
the ultimate arbiters of what is constitutional. The second, perhaps a
necessary corollary of the first, is that judges are independent of other
branches of government. Coke formulated the principle of judicial
review, and his defense of this proposition provided the paradigm of
the independent judge.
II. COKE'S BELIEF IN THE WISDOM OF THE JUDGES
For Coke, law is a matter of judicial decisions, in all this phrase's
meanings. The notable aspect of artificial reason is Coke's focus on the
judge's role in making the law. Another aspect is the emphasis which
Coke placed on the case—a treatment of law-cases as the manifesta-
tions of abstract principles. Finally, there is the attention which Coke
pays to the craft and procedure of judicial lawmaking, the trial process
through which legal artifice is applied.
A. Coke on Custom and the Common Law
In Coke's day, discussions of the character of the common law
tended to conflate different theories of law—reason, custom, and na-
ture. Of these, custom was the most important. It was universally agreed
that the common law was consuetudines angliae, the general customs of
the realm, beliefs and practices so broadly shared by England's people
that they formed the pattern of national character. No sooner had this
perspective been taken, however, than the muddling began; the gen-
eral consensus among the commentators was that what was customary
3 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 698 (C.P. 1610).
4 1 Cranch 187 (1808).
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was reasonable and natural. Thomas Wilson, the most influential rheto-
rician of Elizabethan England, wrote that "that is right by custom which
long time hath confirmed, being partly grounded upon nature and
partly upon reason . . . . "6
Sir John Fortescue had taken a positivist tack, arguing that statutes
were law, whether morally right or not. In the same pages, however,
Fortescue also insisted that English law reflected a morality based on
divine law and linked legal reasoning to natural reason by describing
legal maxims as "universals." Christopher St. German had argued that
the common law was based on reason, but fell back on custom to
explain why certain specific legal rules were followed. Sir John Davies,
Coke's younger colleague, wrote that the common law was based on
custom, but also stated that the "law is nothing but a rule of reason,"
and that "the law of nature . . . is the root and touchstone of all good
laws. "6
Coke too conflated theories of law. Most often, he voiced the
conventional view that the common law was the custom of the realm.
He translated consuetudo angliae as "common law" and remarked that
if a practice were "current throughout the commonwealth," it was part
of the common law. "Customs are either general or particular," he
wrote, "general, which are part of the common law, being current
throughout the whole commonwealth, and used in ... every town, and
every manor."' His usage, however, constantly •shifted toward other
definitions:
5
 THOMAS WILSON, THE ART OF RHETORIC 74-75 (Peter E. Medine ed., Penn. State Univ.
Press 1994) (1553).
6
 The generous theoretical muddle of Tudor jurisprudence is ably surveyed by GLENN
BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF TICE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION 21-78 (1993) and Harold Berman, The
Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, and Hale, 103 YALE U. 1651, 1656-64 (1994).
Fortescuc's views were expressed in his DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM A.voi.osturvi (S.B. Chritnes ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1949) (1470). See also Norman Doe, Pecock and Fortescue: Fifteenth
Century Concepts of Law, 10 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 257 (1989). On St. German, see ST. GERMAN'S
DOCTOR AND STUDENT (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton cds• Selden Soc'y vol. 94, 1974). On Davies,
see J.G.A. POCOCK, TIIE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 32-35 (1987) and Hans
S. Pawlisch, Sir John Davies, the Ancient Constitution, and Civil Law, 23 His-r. J. 689 (1980).
7
 SIR EDWARD COKE., Titz COMPLETE COI'YIIOLDER 70 (1641); see also Parker v. Harrold, 2
Leon. 114, 74 Eng. Rep. 404 (K.B• 1586); COKE, CO. Lrr•., supra note 2, at 1156 ("If it be the
general custom of the realm it is part of the common law"); SIR EDWARD COKE, SECOND PART OF
THE INSTITUTES OF TIIE LAWS OF ENGLAND 58 (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1797 ed.) [hereinafter
2 INSTITUTES] ("comuetudo Anglia' means common law). Coke also suggested that a local custom
might sometimes override the common law (that "a custom, used up on a certain reasonable
cause, depriveth the common law"). Coax, Co. Lar-r., supra note 2, at 113a. He further indicated,
opaquely, that the judges' interpretation of the common law should adopt a meaning derived
from custom:
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The common law of England sometimes is called right, some-
times common right, and sometimes communis justitia. In
the grand charter the common law is called right . . . . And
all the commissions and charters for execution of justice are,
facturi quad ad justitiam pertinet secundum legem et consuetudi-
nem Angliae. So as in truth justice is the daughter of the law,
for the law bringeth her forth. And in this sense being largely
taken, as well the statutes and customs of the realm, as that
which is properly [called] the common law, is included within
common right 8
In this one short passage, Coke shifts from something close to a
natural law view (the common law as common 'right) to customary
law (the common law as the custom of the realm, the laws and
customs of England). Moreover, the entire discussion is lapped in
positivism: Coke's suggestions of what the common law might be in
fact derived from what the common law was called in charters and
commissions. 9
Coke constantly reached out to buttress the common law by link-
ing it to the Judeo-Christian moral tradition, or to the law of nature.
In cataloguing his library, he listed divinity books first, followed by "the
books of the laws of England because they are derived from the laws
of God."'° He also wrote that the keeping of brothel houses was forbid-
den by the law of God, "on which the common law of England in that
case is grounded," and cited five Old Testament sources. 11 In the Star
Chamber, he argued that divine right, rather than common law, gov-
erned the succession to the crown of England,"
And as usage is a good interpreter of laws, so non usage . is a great intendment
that the law will not bear it .... Not that an act of parliament by non user can be
antiquated or lose [its] force, but that it may be expounded or declared how the
act is to be understood.
Coxn, Co. LITT., supra note 2, at 81b.
COKE, CO. LITT., supra note 2, at 142a•-142b.
9 Somewhere further along this line of thinking lay the suggestion of Thomas Egerton, Lord
Ellesmere, that the law of England derived from charters and statutes, See Louts A. KNAFLA, LAW
AND POLITICS IN JACOBEAN ENGLAND: THE TRACTS OF LORD CHANCELLOR ELLESMERE 165-66
(1977); T.F.T. Plucknett, Ellesmere on Statutes, 60 L.Q. REV. 242 (1944).
10 A CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF SIR EDWARD COKE 22 (W.O. Hassan ed., 1950) [herein-
after CATALOGUE]. Significantly, Coke cinched this point with a citation to Sir Edmund Plowden's
Commentaries.
"Sot EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF TI1E INSTITUTES OF TOE LAWS OF ENGLAND 205
(William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1797 ed.) [hereinafter 3 INSTITUTES].
"See Conrad Russell, Divine Rights in the Early Seventeenth Century, in PUBLIC DUTY AND
PRIVATE CONSCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 104,118 (John Morrill et al, eds.,
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In the same breath, Coke attempted to argue both that the com-
mon law was custom and that the common law had not changed since
the days of the Druids (whereas the essence of custom is exactly that
it may evolve to fit the needs of new generations).' 3 If Coke had
rigorously considered the implications of what he asserted, it is doubt-
ful that he would have insisted so hard that the law had never changed.
As Glenn Burgess has observed:
Coke tried, half-heartedly and with a notable lack of success,
to pretend that statutes were declaratory of pre-existent law,
or at best restored law to its pristine purity. Essentially he was
saying that while in theory statutes could alter law and make
new law, in practice (as experience and history tell us) they
had not done so."
Coke's belief in custom was essentially skin-deep. His statements
that the common law expresses custom do not cut down to the core
of his way of thinking about law. He did not work out (as Davies did)
a true theory of common law as customary law. When it actually came
to relating custom to law, to explaining how custom and usage fit into
the harder terrain of legal judgments, Coke held back. He did not tie
custom to the common law; he discussed individual customs as a matter
of copyhold law,' in terms of the localized practices of individual man-
ors.' 5 Moreover, the only common denominator of custom was that
reason defined it. "[O]nly this incident inseparable every custom must
have, viz. that it be consonant to reason; for how long soever it hath
continued, if it be against reason, it is of no force in law."' 5 In the final
analysis, reason and not custom defined law.
Ultimately, Coke's work in legal theory is halfhearted because his
interest in legal practice is so strong. He was less interested in what the
law might be than in what lawyers and judges do. His theory that the
1993). This turned around the common-law theory of allegiance which Coke developed in
Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rcp. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (KB. 1609).
is
	 e.g., SIR EDWARD Coax, Preface to 3 REPORTS (1602), in that extrapolating backward
from forms of writs, Coke felt it proven that "the common law of England had been time out of
mind of man before the conquest." Hereinafter, citations to the prefaces of Coke's Reports will
follow this format, with citations to cases printed in the Reports given as Co. Rep. .
"BURGESS, supra note 6, at 27.
15 See, e.g., Costa, CO. L=., supra note 2, at 62a, where Coke discussed custom in terms of
the "many and divers customs" recognized on a purely local basis in manorial courts, and noted
that in respect of the variety of customs in most manors, it is not possible to set down any [with]
certainty" in the text.
16 1d. Coke carefully added that against reason did not mean "every unlearned man's reason,"
but rather "artificial and legal reason warranted by authority of law: Lex est summa ratio." Id.
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law is "artificial reason" focuses on the work of the judge. The common
law may be reason, but it is the reason of the judges; it may reflect
custom, but it is custom as settled by the judges. His belief in the
excellence of the common law is not a belief in the just prevalence and
practicality of custom; it reflects a judge's faith in the communal,
professional wisdom of the bar—intelligence refined by training, by
artifice.
1. Artifice in Rhetoric and Law
When Coke defined law as the artificial reason of the judges, he
borrowed for jurisprudence a concept rooted in the discipline of
rhetoric. Coke's artificial reason is closely related to the "artificial logic"
which rhetoricians employed in analyzing and discussing issues.'?
Abraham Fraunce's remarks on artificial logic bear particular
comparison with Coke's remarks on law. In 1588, forty years before the
Commentary Upon Littleton, Fraunce wrote:
Logic is an art, to distinguish artificial logic from natural
reason. Artificial Logic is gathered out of diverse examples of
natural reason, which is not any art of logic, but that ingraven
gift and faculty of wit and reason shining in the particular
discourses of several men, whereby they both invent, and
orderly dispose .... This as it is to no man given in full
perfection, so diverse have it in sundry measure . . . . And
then is the logic of art more certain , than that of nature,
because of many particulars in nature, a general and infallible
constitution of logic is put down in art."'
The most significant parallel between artificial logic and artificial
reason—the most significant way in which the rhetoricians' under-
standing of their discipline shaped Coke's understanding of the
lawyers' profession—lies in the idea that professional training and
practice improve upon talent. The artifice applied by the rhetori-
cian came out of orderly invention and disposition, examination
and discussion among thinkers schooled in the rhetorical arts : w The
artifice applied by the lawyer reflected the knowledge acquired by
17 See Allen D. Boyer, Sir Edward Coke, Ciceronianus: Classiral Rhetoric and the Common Law
Tradition, 10 INT'Ll SEMIOTICS L. 3, 6 (1997).
18 AtittAitAm FRAUNCE, THE LAWIERS LOGIN-B o EXEMPLIFYING TIIE PRAEC•PTS OF LOGIKE BY
TM,: PRACTISE OF TIIE COMMON LAWE B.ii (1585).
ig Invention and disposition, mentioned here by Fraunce, were the two great subjects of
rhetorical theory. The first covered the analysis of subjects, using place-logic; the second related
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long study, the regular observance of practice in the courts. More-
over, both Coke and Fraunce shared the belief that the truest
understanding of an issue is that reached by disputation and discus-
sion; the wisdom of the group will be fuller and more trustworthy
than the opinion of any one lawyer or orator. 2° This vision of law
also borroWed from the rhetoricians its emphasis on professional
rigor. Both lawyers and rhetoricians located the individual talent
within a professional tradition, and insisted that the individual per-
spective was constrained and bounded by professional consensus.
Rhetoricians claimed as a special privilege for their discipline that
the highest eloquence could be achieved only by employing its techni-
cal forms. As Thomas Wilson declared, "[m] any speak wisely which
never read logic, but to speak wisely with an argument, and to know
the very foundations of things: that can none do, except they have
some skill in this art."2 ' They further claimed that the sophistication of
their discipline made rhetorical discourse the only appropriate dis-
course for public life. George Puttenham's comments are revealing:
And though grave and wise councilors in their consultations
do not use much superfluous eloquence, and also in their
judicial hearings do much mislike all scholastical rhetorics:
yet in such a case as it may be (and as this Parliament was) if
the Lord Chancellor of England or Archbishop of Canterbury
himself were to speak, he ought to do it cunningly and elo-
quently, which can not be without the use of figures . . . . 22
Privileging rhetoric cleared the way for Coke's privileging of the
judges' reason. The master's command of his discipline (in law as in
rhetoric) provided an unanswerable claim to superior wisdom. More-
over, the rhetoricians' equation of eloquence with rhetorical accom-
to the discussion of topics, that is, the construction, presentation and conclusion, of argument.
See generally W.S. HOWELL, LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN ENGLAND 1500-1700 (1956); WALTER ONG,
RAMUS: METHOD AND THE DECLINE OF DIALOGUE (1958).
20 Significantly, Coke was not the only common lawyer to call the law "artificial reason" or to
describe it in terms patterned on rhetoric. Sir John Dodderidge wrote:
[Law] is called reason; not for that every man can comprehend the same; but it is
artificial reason; the reason of such, as by their wisdom, learning, and long experi-
ence are skillful in the affairs of men, and know what is fit and convenient to be
held and observed for the appeasing of controversies and debates among men, still
having an eye and due regard of justice, and a consideration of the commonwealth
wherein they live.
Sul joitx DODDERIDGE, THE ENGLISII LAWYER 242 (Da Capo Press 1973) (1631).
21 THOMAS WILSON, TIIE RULE or REASON 0.2r-0.2" (Da Capo Press 1970) (1551).
22
 GEORGE PUTTENHAM, THE ART OF ENGLISH POESIE 139 (Gladys Doidge Wilcox Sc Alice
Walker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1936) (1589).
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plishment could be given a corollary: that no trained rhetorician need
accept an argument which did not employ the figures and conventions
of rhetoric. To the extent that common lawyers carried over this per-
spective into law, it may have underlain resistance to changes and
innovations which came from outside the common-law tradition.
Closely related to such thinking is the conclusion that the individ-
ual legal talent cannot outweigh the wisdom, and consensus of the
profession—that, as Coke put it, no man can be wiser than the law.
This is the conclusion to which Coke's discussion of artificial reason
leads. It is also the viewpoint for which Coke risked his career in 1608,
when he told James I, face to face, that His Majesty, no matter what his
natural gifts and intellect, nonetheless lacked the training to decide
cases properly according to the laws of England."
From this perspective, it may seem that Coke asserted the impor-
tance of artificial reason in a defensive context—that he extolled the
merits of professionalism only when change threatened. Indeed, it is
true that artificial reason has certain conservative dimensions. When
it defines law as the collective opinion of lawyers and judges, it defines
law according to the opinion of men with substantial stakes in the
status quo. On the other hand, since Coke's day, artificial reason has
had continuing liberal associations. It has frowned equally not only on
the divine right of kings, but also upon any violent attempt to force
change upon the commonwealth. Perhaps the first occasion on which
Coke argued that one man's will should not prevail against the settled
wisdom of the law was during the speech in which he prosecuted the
Earl of Essex for treason. 24
Moreover, there is a broader, positive active aspect to artificial
reason. Coke articulated this when he discussed how the law should be
learned: "And true it is that Seneca saith . . . 'Quo plus recipit animus,
hoc se magis laxat': the mind, the more it suddenly recciveth, the more
it looseth, and freeth itself.""
23 See Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.13. 1607); see also
Roland C. Usher, fames I and Sir Edward Coke, 18 ENG. HIST. Rev. 664, 664 (1903).
24 Coke's condemnation of Essex clearly looked forward to his statements in the Commentary
Upon Littleton:
The laws, that by long experience and practice of many successions of grave, learned
and wise men, have grown to perfection, arc grounded no doubt upon greater and
more absolute reason than the singulat' and private opinion or conceit of the wisest
man that liveth in the world can find out or attain unto. Therefore the law shall
stand for reason.
BOWEN, supra note 1, al 144-45.
23 SIR EDWARD COKE, Preface to 6 REPORTS (1607). There is a tension here. In the following
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Sir Francis Bacon stated that he preferred to write aphorisms
about the law, rather than to discuss its principles in discursive detail,
because the maxim format "doth allow the wit of man to toss and
tut:n."26
 Bacon argued that the law would be better understood if
students loosed their individual perspectives upon legal principles,
rather than learning by rote what some oracle had taught them. Coke's
trust in the wisdom of the bar shares the same trust in open inquiry
and discussion, the same belief that many intelligences following a
common inquiry will uncover more of the truth.
At the same time that Coke privileges the collective wisdom of the
bench and bar, he also privileges the character of the individual lawyer
and judge. Coke's theory of law as artificial reason, in fact, depends
upon the conscience and intellect of the individual lawyer in the same
way that theories of democracy or republican government rely upon
the virtue of the individual citizen.
Coke resisted any suggestion of taint or bias. "Never can a judge
punish extortion, that is corrupted himself," he wrote in 1604, and
"therefore it is an incident inseparable to good government, that the
magistrates to whom the execution of laws is committed be principal
observers of the same themselves." 27
 It was his favorite boast that he
had never purchased any office of trust. 28
As Coke continued, however, following the law was only one of the
ways in which the judge must "embrace discipline"; it was also neces-
passage, Coke warns students not to seek to learn the law too fast, for "a cursory and tumultuary
reading doth ever make a confused memory, a troubled utterance, and an incertain judgment."
Id. Against this theme, however, one hears the idea of the mind "loosing" and freeing itself, just
as the trial process would "open and enlarge," i.e., set at liberty, the lawyers' understanding. See
id.
26 DANIEL COQUILLE-17E, FRANCIS BACON 38 (1992) (citing 7 SIR FRANCIS BACON, COLLECTED
WORKS 321 (James Spedding et al. eds., 1861)).
27
 SIR EDWARD COKE, Preface to 4 REPORTS (1604). In the same vein, Coke also warned that
those who bought legal office would also have to sell, See COKE, 2 INSTITUTES, supra note 7, at
234, 566; Com, 3 INSTITUTES, supra note 11, at 154. As Christopher Hill has noted: "The example
given is Sir Arthur Ingram's purchase of the office of Cofferer of the Household, so Coke
stretched the conception of legal office far into the Civil Service." CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLEC-
TUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 244 n.1 (1969).
28
 In his private papers, beside a list of the government positions he had held, Coke jotted
down that all these had been acquired sin prece et pretio, without begging and without bribery.
See Historical Manuscripts Commission, Ninth Report: The Manuscripts of the Right Honourable
the Earl of Leicester 374 (1884) (unpublished manuscripts on file at Holkham Hall, Norfolk).
In St. Mary's Church at Tittleshall, Norfolk, Coke's Latin epitaph makes a broad, bold assertion:
Integritas ipsa, verae semper causae constantissimus assertar, nec favore, nee muneribus trialandus (the
soul of honor, ever the steadfast champion of the cause of truth, not to be corrupted by bias or
bribes). Thanks to Nicholas Hills for snaking available information and photographs of the Coke
monuments.
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.
nary for the judge to face cheerfully "the many crosses and dangers of
his calling." With the tenor of his prose rising to sermon pitch, Coke
warned of the judge's duty to be evenhanded:
Et exultate, but yet cum tremore, do all these things lest ye enter
into wrath, and so ye perish from the way of righteousness;
whereby it appeareth, that the greatest loss a judge or magis-
trate can have, is to give himself over to passion, and his own
corrupt will, and to lose the way of righteousness, et pereatis
de via justa. 29
In commenting on a line from Magna Carta, Coke tied together
these disparate strands of theory:
Justitiam vel rectum. We shall not sell, deny, or delay justice
and right. Justitiam vel rectum, neither the end, which is jus-
tice, nor the mean, whereby we may attain to the end, and
that is the law. Rectum, right, is taken here for law, in the same
sense that jus, often is so called. 1. Because it is the right line,
whereby justice distributative is guided, and directed, and
therefore all [judicial commissions] have this clause, facturi
quod ad justitiam pertinet, secundum legem, and consuetudinem
Angliae, that is; to do justice and right, according to the rule
of the law and custom of England . . . . 2. The law is called
rectum, because it discovereth, that which is tort, crooked, or
wrong, for as right signifieth law, so tort, crooked or wrong,
signifieth injury, and injuria est contra jus, against right: recta
linea est index sui, et obliqui, hereby the crooked cord of that,
which is called discretion, appeareth to be unlawful, unless
you take it, as it ought to be, discretio est discernere per legem,
quid fit justum. 3. It is called right, because it is the best
birthright the subject hath, for thereby his goods, lands, wife,
children, his body, life, honor, and estimation are protected
from injury, and wrong: major haereditas venit unicuiq; nos-
trum a jure, et legibus, quam a parentibus."
Significantly, this passage weaves together the idea of artificial rea-
son with moral right and natural justice, linking both to the integrity
of the judge. The process by which the law discovers wrong is the
trial process through which the lawyer's artifice is applied. What
appears to be the judge's right to exercise discretion is really a duty
29 COKE, Preface la 4 REPORTS, supra note 27.
30 COKE, 2 INSTITUTES, supra note 7, at 55.
54	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 (Vol. 39:43
to follow the common law. 3 ' Wherever reasoning fails to conform to
the common law, it is an indiscretion, a word which in Coke's day
already connoted moral deficiency.
Coke buttresses his arguments on both pragmatic and traditional
grounds. He identifies right and law with the protection of individuals'
lives, property and honor and then underlines this realistic viewpoint
by closing with a quotation from Cicero, flattering lawyers with the
reminder that their everyday decisions partake of an ancient tradition
and discipline. By linking this discUssion of right and law to this specific
clause of Magna Carta, Coke reinforces his praise for the judge's
wisdom. To condemn corruption, those who would buy or sell justice,
is another way of praising those wise and selfless adepts who uphold
the law.
Significantly, the integrity demanded of the judge is not a sancti-
monious abstention from misconduct. The good judge's integrity is
active and energetic. For such a magistrate, Coke wrote, "three things
are necessarily required, understanding, authority, and will." He elabo-
rated:
Understanding concerneth things and persons; that is, first
what is right, and just to be done, and what ill, and to be
avoided; secondly, what persons for merit are to be rewarded,
and what for offenses to be punished . . Authority to pro-
tect the good, and to chastise the ill. Will prompt and ready,
duly, sincerely, and truly to execute the law.32
Here, what seems a straightforward list of qualities is enriched by
another lawyer's pun. For the lawyers of Coke's day (drilled in
rhetoric for years, throughout grammar school and university),
authority had numerous meanings. It could mean personal 'pres-
ence, the gravitas which Shakespeare's Kent recognized in his sov-
ereign King Lear." But authority could also be read in the scriptural
or legal sense, to mean citation to precedent or doctrine, a refer-
ence to an accepted text.
31
 The judge's authorization to follow his discretion could only be understood as an authori-
zation to proceed according to the common law; securietum sanas discretiones had to be read
secundum legem et ammetudinem Angiiae. According to Littleton, discretio meant discernere per
legem, "that is, to discern by the right line of law, and not by the crooked cord of private opinion,
which the vulgar call discretion." Cotta, CO, Ltrr., supra note 2, at 227b.
32
 COKE, Preface to 4 REPORTS, supra note 27.
• 33
 "Authority," Kent tells his liege-lord, is what is written on Lear's face: 'you have that in
your countenance which I would fain call master." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act 1, sc.
4, at 26-30 (1608).
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By playing on words, Coke associated the judge's personal bearing
and political rank with the professional resources which the judge
could marshal1. 34 To these definitions, Coke added a third, defining
authority as a matter of protecting the right and punishing the wrong.
This in turn connected the judge's comprehension of the law with his
resolve to pursue its demands and necessary implications.
2. The Judge as Artist and Artisan
In one sense, Coke treats the judge as an artist, someone whose
resolution of legal problems derives from individual talent, intuitive
understanding and professional skill. From another perspective, he
regards the judge as something of a master artisan, possessed of a due
regard for the practices of his guild and unfailingly able to select the
right tool for the job at hand. Beyond this, he sees the judge as an
effective, pragmatic administrator, well able to shape doctrine and
decision to the needs of the commonwealth.
The artistic model is a useful one for approximating Coke's un-
derstanding of artificial reason. Coke's vision of judicial lawmaking
involves, unmistakably, a belief that the good judge will work within
the established tradition of the law, appreciating the discipline's con-
ventions and respecting the work itself—which is another way of saying
that he will work from an aesthetic perspective. This is very different
from, for example, Jeremy Bentham's vision of law as engineering—a
matter of surveying the shortest route and razing whatever stands in
the way."
The way in which artificial reason may differ from natural reason,
in both operations and results, has been fluently described by Charles
Gray:
One property gained by intense training in English law (be-
side sharpening of common intellectual faculties and stored-
up knowledge of rules, cases, research methods, etc.) is an
"aesthetic" feel for the system that operates as a control on
stock responses. An initiate possessed of this property will
sometimes be disposed to resolve first-inpression cases in a
The other side of Coke's praise for the learning of judges and attorneys was a scathing
contempt for unlearned men who meddled in the law. "To say the truth," he wrote, "the greatest
questions arise not upon any of the rules of the common law, but sometimes upon conveyances
and instruments made by the unlearned; many times, upon wills intricately, absurdly, and repug•
rant act down by parsons, scriveners, and other such itnperites." SIR EDWARD COKE, Preface to 2
REPORTS (1602).
35 See generally .jutzmY BENTHAM, WORKS (Russell & Russell Co., 1962).
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different way than an exemplary lay reasoner . . . Here the
ordinary modern use of "art" may be a guide: A lawyer is an
"artist," not only in the sense that he has a techne or skill .. .
but also in the sense that long acquaintance with a certain
type of artifact has given him a refined sense of "what fits," of
what response is correct on an unexpected occasion. 36
As Gray elaborates, artificial reason is a form of "legal imagination."
Treating the law as a coherent system, it examines "ways in which a
rule or ruling on one.point fits with the given state of the law in
other respects. Its attunement is to harmonies, and distant ones
count, as they do in an artistic composition.""
Some explanations of legal rules, as Gray continues, are obvious.
Some others can be discovered only by the trained talent. For example,
if someone disseised from a feudal holding does not pursue that claim
in a timely manner, because he or she was overseas, the traveler can
nonetheless assert that claim upon returning to England. One reason
for this (and the first one given by Coke) is that it would be impossible
for the overseas traveler to make the requisite "continual claim." If
impossibility operates to excuse inaction in other areas of the law, it
ought to be held a valid excuse here. The legal artist, however, looks
beyond this. A traveler in France might be able to keep informed of
affairs in England, and thus be able to assert a timely claim. It might
be fair to require a timely claim where the facts show such knowledge.
"But then the artist thinks of something more remote," Gray com-
ments. "It so happens that English law holds it impossible for juries to
find events alleged to have taken place abroad . . . . If English law is
blind to France in one respect, so—for the sake of artistic coherence—
must it be in others."36
In short, the artifice of artificial reason lies in its use of proofs
which are complex as well as elegant. The legal imagination, the
lawyers' artificial reason, maps decisions into more than one plane of
law, working from congruences that the lay intelligence would not
consider.
Such explanations are very good as far as they go, and they go a
long way. Nonetheless, Coke's view of law as artificial reason is both
"Charles Gray, Reason, Authority, and Imagination: The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke, in
CULTURE AND POLITICS FROM PURITANISM TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT 25, 61 (Perez Zagorin ed.,
1950).
" Id. at 34.
38 Id. al 64. Coke's discussion of continual claim is found at COKE, Co. Lirr., supra note 2,
al 250a-264a, and especially Cox.E, CO. LITT., supra note 2, at 260b-261b.
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For the lawyer, like the rhetorician,, the idea is to offer copious
argument, several reasons for one party to prevail, several purposes
served by a single accepted principle—numerous proofs, as many as
possible. Where artificial reason means checking the places, brain-
storming with checklists, the technique of analysis becomes the mode
of analysis. The workings of artificial reason are seldom as close to the
workings of artificial logic as at this juncture.
This preference for seriatim argument reveals itself throughout
Coke's work. Coke's two most famous cases illustrate the point. In
Bonham's. Case (1610), Coke offered five giounds for holding that the
College of Physicians could not imprison unlicensed practitioners; the
rationale which originated judicial review was the fourth of these five. 43
In Shelley's Case (1581), Coke seems to have gained victory by erecting
a bulwark of nearly a dozen arguments against the radical, ingenious
propositions put forward by plaintiffs counse1. 44
To approach legal argumentation as the seriatim presentation of
different arguments makes for a jurisprudence which is guided by
function rather than aesthetic. The advocate whose arguments range
from the obvious to the subtle may be orchestrating distant harmonies
within the law. More than likely, however, he may also be hammering,
from all accessible angles, on the problem at hand. If several argu-
ments are bundled together, this may not be because they all represent
different harmonics of the same chord; they may be massed together
to cumulate their weight.
B. Jurisprudential Pragmatism and Coke's Focus on the Case
With this argument-by-argument approach to reasoning goes a
case-by-case perspective on jurisprudence. Coke constantly emphasizes
the individual case: the specific facts which are at issue, the legal
arguments which may be based on those facts. "Generalities never
bring anything to a conclusion," he wrote in 1607, looking forward
almost three centuries to Holmes's statement that abstract proposi-
tions do not decide concrete cases. 45
 To be sure, Coke praises certainty
43
 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610); see infra notes 140-41.
44 See Shelley's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 8813,76 Eng. Rep. 199 (KAI 1581); Bonham's Case, 8 Co.
Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638. There arc two great classes of legal thinkers, those who group
together many different cases as illustrations of a single legal principle, and those who group
many different legal principles together to support a single case. So to speak, these different
groups are respectively jurisprudence's hedgehogs and foxes. Shelley's Case first made Coke's
reputation, and deservedly so. Where Jeremy Bentham and C.C. Langdell are preeminent hedge-
hogs, Shelley's Case marked Coke as one of the most notable foxes.
45 COKE, Preface to 6 REpowrs, supra note 27. Nor does Coke confuse symmetry with validity.
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in law. "Certainty is the mother of quietness and repose," he wrote. On
another occasion he noted that "Mt is a miserable bondage and slavery
when the law is wandering or uncertain."'" In according this praise,
however, lie is not making a metaphysical claim that English law is
perfect or sempiternally established. He rather reiterates his call for
avoiding "incertain judgment."" Where incertain means hasty or unre-
liable, as it does here, certain means sound or trustworthy."
The certainty to which Coke aspires is not the specious certitude
of the legal metaphysician. Rather, it looks toward the economist's
observation that the definition of rights is necessary for orderly com-
merce, because only what is clearly defined can be accurately valued
or meaningfully exchanged. From the legal perspective, this ordering
is reflected in the ability of attorneys and clients to predict the resolu-
tion of foreseeable disputes. Coke takes up this point with his observa-
tion that, "[i]n all my time, I have not known two questions made of
the right of descent of escheats, by the common law, &c. so certain and
sure thereof the rules be."" Indeed, he seems to have equated certainty
in law with security of tenure. He wrote that by publishing his Reports
he sought "the common good" of "quieting and establishing . . . the
possessions of many."5°
Coke clearly considers the case as an epitome of law. To the right
reason of the law, he continues:
[Ni]o one man alone with all his true and utmost labor, nor
all the actors in them themselves by themselves, out of a court
In Mary Portingion's Case, Coke led the Common Pleas in declaring that no condition or
limitation (no matter what its form) was good' if it sought to restrain alienation. 10 Co. Rep. 35b,
77 Eng. Rep. 976 (K.B. 1614). In tracing degrees or consanguinity, an area in which the law might
possibly draw lines of geometric precision, Coke also declined to insist on symmetry. Ile was
willing to allow a widower to marry the daughter of the sister of his first wife, while maintaining
that a nephew could not marry his uncle's widow (two relationships which mirror each other and
involve identical degrees of kinship). See CoKE, CO. Lrrr., supra note 2, at 235a.
"Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 42a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 316 (K.B. 1605) ("Quad
misera et servitus, ube jets esi vagum"); CoxE, Co. Ixr-r., supra note 2, at 212a.
47 See COKE, Preface to 6 REPORTS, supra note 25.
In the same vein, Coke defined a legal maxim as "a sure foundation or ground of art, and
a conclusion of reason." Com, Co. Lrrr,, supra note 2, at 10b-11a. The trustworthiness of a
principle measures its worth; it is not to be accepted merely . because it fits well with other
postulates.
In calling for certainty, Coke also calls for a settling of the law—some sort of law reform. Ile
expresses the same impulse which would lead Bacon to call for codification of England's laws.
Where Bacon failed to revise the laws, due to the lack of state support, Coke's independent
initiative would largely achieve this goal.
49 COKE, Preface to 2 REPORTS, supra note 34.
50 SIR EDWARD COKE, Preface to 1 REPORTS (1600).
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of justice, nor in court without solemn argument, (where (I
am persuaded) Almighty God openeth and enlargeth the
understanding of the desirous of justice and right) could ever
have attained unto. For it is one amongst others of the great
honors of the common laws, that cases of great difficulty are
never adjudged or resolved in tenebris or sub silentio sup-
pressis rationibus; but in open court, and there upon solemn
and elaborate arguments.5 '
Here, Coke treats the judicial decision as a process by which law is
made. What matters was the process of argumentation which lay
behind the reports of the learned judges, rather than the ease with
which the report could be understood. The case is to be trusted not
because it could be easily understood, or because it framed the
issues. It is to be trusted because the crystallization of the facts and
elucidation of the principles had been established through the
process of a trial,"
In the Commentary Upon Littleton, Coke makes a bilingual pun
which reveals much about his theory of courts and justice. In discussing
the term regula, law-Latin for principle or rule of law, he comments:
"Regularly judges ought to adjudge according to the common intend-
ment of law."" In the same passage, he translates intendment as intellec-
tus, "the understanding or intelligence of the law." This suggests, in
turn, that Coke connected the regulae of judicial decision-making with
the regular, orderly observance of judicial practice: the open hearing
of cases, the development of facts, and the argumentation which elu-
cidated principles. He connected this, in turn, with the collective
wisdom which the process focused. This connection reinforces his
identification of artificial reason with the rightly decided case by em-
phasizing the process of decision-making.
In his Treatise on Bail and Mainprize, Coke reworked the same idea
of artificial reason. The elaborations he provided at this juncture
illuminate the close connections he drew between the skill which the
judge employs and the specific facts on which the judge focuses:
51 SIR EDWARD COKE, Preface to 9 REPORTS (1613).
52
 Later Coke again made she link between argumentation and understanding: "And well
doth [Littleton] couple arguments and reasons together, Quia argumenta ignota et obscure ad
lucent ratiards proferuni et recidunt splendida: And therefore arguntentari el ratiocinari, are many
times are taken for one." Coicz, Co. LITT., supra note 2, at 395a.
55
 CORE, CO. Lirr., supra note 2, at 78b.
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[1] t is a great contentment . . . and a good conscience, espe-
daily in cases that concern the life and liberty of a man, to
follow the precedent of grave and learned men . . . . It is
therefore very necessary, that the law and discretion should
be concomitant, and that one to be an accident inseparable
to the other, so as neither law without discretion, lest it should
incline to rigor, nor discretion without law, lest confusion
should follow, should be put in use: my meaning hereby, is
not to allow of every man's discretion . . . but I mean that
discretion that ariseth upon the right discerning, and due
consideration of the true and necessary circumstances of the
matter; and as commonly use to say, that common law is
nothing else but common reason . . . 51
In conclusion, Coke reemphasized that he allowed and required of
judges the same discretion "that either grave and learned men have
used before or rise of the circumstances of the matter."55
As such passages show, Coke saw the determination of the individ-
ual case and the application of the legal principle as different functions
linked by an equal sign. Or, to expand the equation: the common law
equals common reason equals the right understanding of the individ-
ual case. For Coke, to follow a legal rule was not to adhere to a
principle so much as it was to accede to the wisdom of judges who had
previously considered similar cases. 56 The law can be rightly followed
and applied only where the true facts of the case are fully understood. 57
Coke repeatedly emphasizes the circumstances upon which the judge
acts, tying decisions to the facts. He equates the proper application of
the law, of the legal rule, with the rightful, careful exercise of discretion
by the judge—the judicious exercise of discretion, in every sense of the
word.
Behind this outlook lies the inexorable, energetic pragmatism of
Tudor law, with its steely desire to measure judicial decisions by state
policy. The lawyers of Coke's day, deeply schooled in Ciceronian rheto-
ric, equated argumentation and adjudication with the government of
54 SIR EDWARD COKE, A LITTLE TREATISE OF BAILE AND MAINPRIZE 29-30 (Da Capo Press
1973) (1635).
55 14. at 31.
56 Coke affirmed that the student of law would observe in English law, across the centuries,
"the coherence and concordance or such infinite, several and divers cases (one, as it were with
sweet consent and amity, proving and approving another)." COKE, Preface to 3 REPORTS, supra
DOW 13.
57 'MS understanding of adjudication focuses closely on the cases, so closely that Coke felt
it necessary to begin his discussion by emphasizing that he saw rules beyond cases. It was truly
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a commonwealth. Tudor judges were active agents of the royal will,
directing the implementation of royal policy and gathering informa-
tion across their assize circuits. Given this grounding in politics and
commerce, it is no accident that Coke's jurisprudential touchstone was
the soundness of individual decisions—individual resolutions of factual
disputes—rather than the architectonic symmetry of legal principles.
Ultimately, Coke argues that artificial reason is not abstract rea-
soning. So to speak, it is law in action. To follow artificial reason is to
respond, to apply discretion, to the specific facts developed by the case.
It is in this light that one must approach the closely-argued cases
which appear throughout Coke's jurisprudence. So precise are the
details insisted on in these cases, that the decisions may give the
impression that the courts and lawyers are drawing distinctions when
no real differences exist. However, this pattern of argument is not often
an instance of legal hairsplitting; rather, it reflects a consistent practice
of reading closely the facts before the court.
Under a given testator's will, should the surviving sons be able to
make leases and settle property? That depends on the facts. If the sons
are bachelors, and knights, they should be able to make leases and
settle prope'rty on their wives; gentlemen of such rank are not likely to
till and manure their estates themselves, and unless they can arrange
good marriage settlements they will not be able to make good
matches.'8
When another testator, a yeoman, leaves one son property worth
four pounds per year, requiring that the son pay forty shillings a year
to each of his three brothers and one sister, the technical question of
whether this is a condition or a limitation reflects the practical concern
of whether the inheriting son can sell the property. This issue can only
be settled by analyzing all of the facts—by recognizing that the total of
eight pounds which the son must pay to his siblings in no way reflects
a fair purchase price for the land in question. If the son is not paying
said, he admitted, "that Judicium est legibus & non exemplis: And as the logician saith, Exempla
demonstrant, non probant."COKE, supra note 54, at 29. By exemplum, Coke meant an example: an
incident, a parable, an illustration—a case. See Boyer, supra note 17, at 27-29.
The Latin maxims lend a veneer of idealism to a nominalist mindset. Coke quotes them only
so that he'may emphasize the contrary viewpoint—essentially, that lines of precedent arc deter-
mined by similar patterns of fact rather than as illustrations of a common principle. At other
times, Coke clearly adopted this perspective. In Ognel v. Pastan, a case from his practice days, he
explicitly slated: And although the proverb, Exempla illustrant, non docent ant probant, may
hold true in some arts and sciences, in our law, examples are good arguments." 2 Leon. 84, 86,
74 Eng. Rep. 377, 379 (Ex. 1587).
5H See Read and Nashe's Case, 1 Leon. 147, 74 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B. 1589).
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the full value, it makes no sense, and the testator could not have
intended, that he receive the full estate."
What seem to be lawyerly debates over technical distinctions al-
most invariably mask disagreements which have significant practical
consequences, If a parishioner agrees to pay five pounds to his minis-
ter, this may be either a covenant to pay money or a grant of tithes for
life—but much hangs on the distinction, because a grant of tithes
requires a written agreement to be enforceable, and five pounds may
be half of the minister's yearly income. 60 There may be a critical
difference between whether a mortgage is repaid when the creditor
helps the debtor count the money and put it in bags, or when the
debtor subsequently hands the money to the creditor in the porch of
a specified church. 6 ' A dyer's vat fixed to the wall of a house may be a
fixture, which sheriffs officers cannot seize for the payment of the
dyer's debts, while a vat which stands in the middle of the floor is
chattel property on which the officers can rightfullyei vy.62
Toward the end of his career, Coke took great care in describing
a series of actions which had almost, but not quite, amounted to a
crime:
G. Leake a clerk of the chancery joined two clean parchments
fit for letters patent so close together with mouth glue, as they
were taken for one, the uppermost being very thin, and did
put one label through them both, then upon the uppermost
he wrote a true patent, and got the great seal put to the label,
so the label and the seal were annexed to both the parch-
ments, the one written and the other blank: he cut off the
glued skirts round about, and took off the uppermost parch-
ment (which was written, and was a true and perfect patent)
from the label which with the great seal still did hang to the
parchment, then he wrote another patent on the blank parch-
ment, and did publish it as a good patent . . . . And upon
conference had between the judges, upon great advisement
and consideration it was in the end ... resolved by the judges
59 See Wellock v. Hammond, Cro. Eliz. 204, 78 Eng. Rep. 460 (KB. 1590).
60 See Woodward v. Bugg, 2 Leon. 29, 74 Eng. Rep. 381 (KB. 1588). On the uncertain
financial situation of Elizabethan clergymen, see CHRISTOPHER HILL, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF
THE ENGLISH CIILIRCII FROM ARCHBISHOP WHITGIFT TO TILE LONG PARLIAMENT 1 111-13 (1956).
61 See Winter v. Loveday, 2 Leon. 213, 74 Eng. Rep. 487 (K.B. 1589).
62 See Day v. Austin, Owen 70, 74 Eng. Rep. 908 (C.P. 1595); see also CoKE, CO. LITT., supra
note 2, at 53a. All of the factual situations discussed in this paragraph—what proof is required
to support a contract, the application of the perfect tender rule, and the vexed question of when
a chattel becomes a fixture—continue to recur in contemporary litigation.
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(saving a very few) . . . that it was no counterfeiting of the
great seal within [the] statute, that this offence was neither
high treason, nor petit treason . . . and the party delinquent
liveth at the present day.63
How much effort did it cost him to write that, his septuagenarian
fingers scratching at the paper with a goose-quill pen? Yet Coke
recorded it all, the details of the forgery and the great advisement
and consideration which the judges gave. The sardonic note on
which he closes, the observation that Leake was allowed to keep his
head, underlines the discretion which the judges knew they were
exercising. It reminds that slightly different facts might have sent
things a very different way.
C. Law, Lore, and Office Procedures
Coke's vision of law as the lawyer's craft takes his jurisprudence
into territory that is almost uniquely his own. His discussions of law
constantly sweep into the concrete details of legal practice. They com-
prehend not only the law, but also the lore and the office procedure:
the fundamental rules, the understandings which surround those
rules, and the routines and formalities which must be negotiated. More
than any other jurisprudent (with the notable exception of Karl Llew-
ellyn), Coke approaches the lawyer's work on all these levels. He
advises his readers that poor and middling men may safely accept royal
grants passed under the Exchequer seal, "but to you who are rich, my
advice is to pass your leases under the Great Seal, for that is the sure
way."64
 He provides specific recommendations on how to prepare a will:
have the scrivener use only one parchment, carefully sign any inter-
lineations or erasures, and procure credible witnesses. 65
 He lists the ten
Cotta, 3 INsTrroTEs, supra note 11, at 16; see also George Leak's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 15, 77
Eng. Rep. 1297 (K.B. 1607).
" Lane's Case, 2 Co. Rep, 16b, 17b, 76 Eng. Rep. 423, 430 (C.P. 1596). Professor Matthew
Mirow of St. Louis University has reviewed Elizabethan readings on the Statute of Wills in a paper
presented at the 1997 British Legal History Conference. Professor Mirow confirms that this
emphasis on procedure and detail, even among attorneys of the same era, is almost uniquely
Coke's.
In his own legal affairs, certainly, Coke showed painstaking attention to detail, as appears
from inspection of what he called his "Great Book of Conveyances," Holkham MS. 764, a folio
volume fully four inches thick, with impressive brass corner plates. For each of the estates Coke
had acquired, this book records the early history of the property and recites verbatiin chief
documents in the chain of title. The final craftman's touch are the marginalia added in Coke's
own hand, noting the nature of each transfer, e.g., whether by fine or by common recovery.
65 See Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25a, 3fia-36b, 76 Eng. Rep. 684, 709-10 (K.B.
1591).
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parts of a deed.° He carefully records the etiquette to be followed in
beheading a traitor of noble birth. 67 Polonius-like, he advised his chil-
dren to carefully treasure up "evidences," the documents setting forth
title to their estates.°
The lawyers' artifice, it thus appears, is not just intelligence and
sensitivity, a cultivated appreciation of the law and its arcana; it
also comprehends technical accomplishment and mastery of detail.
Coke called for part of the apprentice's "long study" to be devoted to
these aspects:
It is requisite for every student to get precedents and ap-
proved forms not only of deeds, . • . but of fines and other
conveyances, and assurances, and specially of good and per-
fect pleadings, and of the right entries, and forms of judg-
ments, which will stand him in great stead, both while he
studies, and after when he shall give counsel.°
Good pleading was so critical, Coke warned, that it was "a necessary
part of a good common lawyer to be a good prothonotary."7°
The end of artificial reason is not only to attain a true under-
standing of the law. It also means to follow the better practice, with all
the everyday concerns which this entails. Indeed, Coke emphasizes that
the sages of the law were to be consulted for points of conveyancing,
no less than for guidance on thorny legal issues:
[lit is not safe for any man (be he never so learned) to be of
counsel with himself in his own case, but to take advice of
other great and learned men. Non prosunt dominis quae pro-
sunt omnibus, artes. And the reason hereof is, in suo quisque
negotio hebetior est, quam in alieno. 7 '
13° See CoKE, Co. LITT., supra note 2, at 35b.
67 See Judgment and Execution in Treason and Felony, 12 Co. Rcp. 130, 77 Eng. Rep, 1404
(K.B. 1616).
66 See C.W. JAMES, CHIEF JUSTICE COKE: HIS FAMILY AND His DESCENDANTS AT HOLKIIAM 323
(1929).
° COKE, CO. LITT., supra note 2, at 230a. Peter Goodrich has made the intriguing suggestion
that this attitude reflects the fact that legal writing, and the transactions behind such writing,
represent "a ritual system of inscription"—that the "scribal culture of feudal chirography (hand-
writing), of the engrossing and tabling of fines and charges relating to land, was gradually
systematised by doctrinal writers into a legal eaigure." PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAw:
FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS 122, 139-44 (1990). The close connection between
lawyers' learning and scriveners' procedure was acknowledged at an earlier juncture. A Jacobean
edition of William West's Symboleographie was dedicated to Coke. See CATALOGUE, supra note 10,
at 30.
"COKE, CO. LITT., supra note 2, at 303a.
71 Id. at 377b.
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Because the concept of artificial reason is so closely tied to pro-
fession and craft, defining law as artificial reason privileges what a
lawyer would call arcana and what a nonlawyer would call technicali-
ties. Coke's view of law accords respect to the lawyer who picks apart
the record and wins a case by finding a flaw in the pleadings.72 It smiles
on legal sophistry, the ability to argue both sides of a case. As a
practicing lawyer, at different times and in different cases, Coke argued
both that small errors voided indictments and that small errors did not
void indictments."
Coke and his fellow professionals distrusted change," but they
applauded ingenuity, the masterful ringing of changes within the ex-
isting system. Coke himself was well able to twist pleadings to his
client's advantage, as a case from his practice days shows:
Action of trover in London. The defendant pleaded, that
long time before the conversion supposed to be, J.S. was
possessed of these goods, as of his own goods, at B. in Norfolk;
and that he before the conversion supposed did casually lose
them, and they came to the hand of J. Palmer by trover, who
gave them to the plaintiff, who lost them in London; and the
defendant found them, and afterward did convert them to
his own use, by the command of the same J.S. as it was lawful
for him to do. It was moved that this is no plea, for it amounts
to the general issue.—But all the justices held it a good plea;
for it confesseth the possession and property in the plaintiff,
against all but the lawful owner.—Nota. This plea was devised
by Coke to alter the trial."
To devise a plea to alter the trial: however tricky and technical that
sounds to Coke and his fellow professionals, that was part of a
lawyer's proper work."
72 Coke himself had done so on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Hasset v. Payne, Cro. Eliz. 256,
78 Eng. Rep. 511 (K.B. 1591); Gomersall and Gomersall's Case, Godbolt 55, 78 Eng. Rep. 34 (KB.
1586).
75
 Compare Anonymous, Godbolt 65, 78 Eng. Rep. 40 (KB. 1586) (Coke argued that small
errors should not void an indictment), with Martin van Henbeck's Case, 2 Leon. 38, 74 Eng. Rep.
339 (Ex. 1588) (Coke argued that an indictment for false labeling of pipes of wine was insufficient
because it failed to show the exact number of vessels improperly labeled), and Goslen's Case,
Cro. Eliz. 137, 78 Eng. Rep. 394 (KB. 1589) (which saw an "indictment quashed for bad Latin,"
following an argument by Coke).
74
 See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
76 Rockwood v. Feasar, Cro. Eliz. 262, 78 Eng. Rep. 517 (KB. 1591).
76 By contrast, Lord Ellesmere suggested that such pleadings be banned. In a memorandum
on law reform, Ellesmere urged:
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Coke unhesitatingly accepted the use of fines and common recov-
eries as ways of transferring title to land." He was concerned that fines
and recoveries be executed properly—not with whether there might
be simpler ways of transferring title, or whether sham lawsuits might
represent a cancer on the legal system. He noted how Chief Justice
Dyer had "with great gravity and some sharpness" reproved an utter-
barrister who spoke against common recoveries. Coke quoted Dyer
approvingly, to the effect that "he was not worthy to be of the profes-
sion of the law, who durst speak against common recoveries, which
were the sinews of assurances of inheritances, and founded upon great
reason and authority." 7s
"Relations are but fictions in law," Coke wrote. 79 This sentence
speaks volumes. It shows that Coke equated a perspective that is explic-
itly counter-factual, which is established only by consensus (the legal
fiction) with a perspective which derives easily from observable fact
(the relation). Moreover, Coke was wholeheartedly willing to make use
of fictions. The years in which he sat as chief justice of the King's Bench
were among those in which that court was using latitat to expand its
jurisdiction."
That actions upon the case, upon false surmises and fictions in law videlicet that
corn, hay, lead, tin, wood, and etc. which was growing in Cornwall or Yorkshire,
and was lost and found in London or Middlesex and etc., he not hereafter suffered
for trial of the estate, right, or title of lands lying in foreign counties. For this is a
novelty and a trick newly devised, and bath no precedent or example in the Register,
or in the books of the law, and is contrary to the ancient institution, and true
grounds of the law.
KNAFLA, supra note 9, at 275.
" See, e.g., Mary Portington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 43a, 77 Eng. Rep. 976, 989 (K.B. 1614)
(Coke specifically equated the collusion and fictions of the common recovery with the "common
conveyance and assurance of lands."); Dormer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 40a, 40h, 77 Eng. Rep. 115, 115
(K.B. 1593). In Dormer's Case, he virtually confessed that he saw no alternative to such sham
proceedings, "et saepenumero necessitas vincit communem legem, & quod necessarium est licit'
est.." 5 Co. Rep. at 406, 77 Eng. Rep. at 117.
76 Mary Porting-Ian's Case, 10 Co. Rep. at 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 984.
"COKE, 2 INSTITUTES, SUpra I101e 7, at 590.
gt) In latitat proceedings, a plaintiff alleged that an imaginary trespass had been committed,
in order to have the defendant arrested, then followed up with a genuine complaint once the
defendant was in custody (which could include being out on bail). Using this fictitious action
allowed the plaintiff to sue via a bill in the King's Bench, rather than using an original writ to
mart the action in the Common Pleas (a more cumbersome and expensive procedure). Most
fictional trespasses were notionally alleged to have occurred in Middlesex, where the King's Bench
sat. Because most defendants could not be found in Middlesex, "one further rigmarole" was
needed: "the plaintiff had to inform the court that the defendant 'lurks and roams about' (latitat
et diseurrii) in some other county, say Yorkshire; the court then issued a writ called a latitat to
the sheriff of that county, Who Was able to effect the arrest," IR BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGL/SII LEGAL HISTORY 51 (3d ed. 1990).
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To define law in terms of the lawyers' artificial reason gave a
particular privilege to the legal caste. It invested the terms of legal
documents with the meanings used by lawyers, irrespective of other
meanings which such words conveyed. 81
 This was one of the most
significant achievements of Coke's era, and one of its least happy. For
the next four centuries, whenever the terms of a legal document
required definition, English courts would apply the private, technical
meaning current among the bar. When construing contracts, courts
arrogated to themselves the construction of disputed terms, refusing
to -hear what the parties themselves had meant. The street argot of
Chancery Lane increasingly diverged from the language of the testa-
tors whose wills were construed there. According to the judges, the
term descendants or relations did not cover illegitimate children, and
Baker has noted that:
(FIrom a trickle of latitats at the end of the fifteenth century, and a few hundred
rolls a year, within a century the court was issuing—according to a contemporary
estimate-20,000 latitats a year and filling 6,000 rolls. Between 1560 and 1640 the
increase in King's Bench suits was particularly dramatic, perhaps as much as tenfold.
Id.
81 Shelley's Case, I Co. Rep. 88b, 76 Eng. Rep. 199 (KB. 1581), the facts and stratagems of
which arc penetratingly reconstructed by A.W.B. Simpson in his recent Leading Casts in the
Common Law (1995), reflected this shift. The case involved a grant to A and his heirs—specifically,
a transfer which limited an estate "to the use of A for life, remainder after 24 years to the heirs
male of the body of A in tail male." In past centuries, under feudalism, the law had understood
a grant to A and to A's heirs as the transfer to A of a freehold estate. A would hold the property
for life, in fee simple, and then his heirs would have it. The heirs received nothing immediately;
they were considered to receive the property ultimately by descent from their ancestor A.
In Shelley's Case, the lawyers pried open deeper levels of meaning in this language. Counsel
for plaintiff Richard Shelley, taking advantage of the case's peculiar facts, argued that the phrase
and his heirs was actually a term "of purchase," describing who took an immediate interest (if
Richard took as an heir, by descent, he would lose the property at issue because a closer heir had
subsequently been born; but if he were a purchaser, he immediately received an interest which
later events could not rob him of). To counter this argument, Coke produced more than half a
dozen reasons why Richard could take only by descent.
In winning the case, Coke achieved a result consonant with precedent. The assembled judges
of England held that the language did not make Richard Shelley a purchaser. But while preserv-
ing the results which the medieval common law would have reached, Shelley's Case marked the
ascendancy of a radically different mode of reasoning. As John Baker has written:
What in medieval times had been a feudal rule was now turned into a rule of
construction .... No full reasons seem to have been given, but it is significant that
the judges rejected the defendant's argument that it was simply a matter of giving
effect to the settlor's intention.
BAKER, supra note 80, at 324.
Under the feudal regime, the language of the law had been the common tongue of the legal,
social, and political realms. The words creating a freehold transfer had a single meaning in all
these different areas. With the era of Shelley's Case, law became the language of the lawyers.
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when family members drowned in the same maritime disaster, courts
refused to say that their deaths coincided."
If the law remained artificial reason, reason had petrified within
the artifice. Not until the 1950's, prodded by Lord Denning, would the
English bench once again begin to read documents in terms of the
parties' original intent. The legal regime which Coke had helped
install during the reign of Elizabeth I endured until the reign of
Elizabeth II."
Conversely, just as Coke identified the legal idea with the idealized
judicial opinion, so he conceived the law's shortcoming in terms of
badly-decided cases. Behind his distrust of reform lay a refusal to
believe that the system could be flawed. "I affirm it constantly," he
wrote, "that the law is not incertain in abstracto, but in concreto, and
that the incertainty thereof is hominis vitium, and not professionis.""
Judges might make wrong decisions, or lawyers might disagree, but
these contretemps could not be considered to impair the law's charac-
ter as summa ratio.
There is heartfelt self-congratulation in this perspective." What
redeems this understanding of law, preserving it from self-absorption
in arcana and lazy self-contentment with the existing order, is its hard
core of reliance on duty and responsibility. Coke's insistence on the
good judge being eo ipso a good man is matched by his insistence that
the lawyer maintain the responsibilities of his role. The heart of the
law is good pleading, Coke maintained. This attitude reflects the law-
yer's concern with framing an issue so that a court can only address it
squarely. It also reflects the judge's concern that an issue be squarely
framed so that it can be properly decided. The attorney's concern with
82 See LORD DUNNING, THE DISCIPLINE Or LAW 23-53 (1979). The two egregious cases cited
arc, respectively, Sydall v. Castings Ltd., 1 Q.B. 302 (1967), and Re Rowland, Ch. 1 (1963).
88 Whether Coke himself would have persisted in such readings of legal language remains
doubtful. His practice had often involved construing the terms of documents drafted to the
satisfaction of people who should have known better. See, e.g., Higttam v Norwood, Moore 221,
72 Eng. Rep. 542 (K.B. 1585), in which the will of a prosperous but illiterate yeoman failed to
define appurtenances sufficiently. In Blamford v. Blamford, the lawyers' debate over the terms of
a will provoked a growl from the chief justice: "Lay-men do not know what a survivor means." 3
Bulstrode 98, 101, 81 Eng. Rep. 84, 86 (K.13. 1611),
84 Costa, Preface to 9 REPORTS, supra note 51.
As Peter Goodrich has pointed out.:
The tradition, in other words, precisely as tradition, is perfect . ... [Mere is no
place for criticism in that custodial task of exposition of a law too rich and deep to
he fully comprehended in any one body in any one lifetime. The law is always
greater, in other words, than its servants, its practitioners: any apparent faults or
contradictions are the errors of men and not of the law.
Goomucti, supra note 69, at 50.
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preparing the individual client's case shaded into the judge's concern
with the exercise of his rightful powers.
D. Artificial Reason and Activist Jurisprudence ,
Defining law as artificial reason gave tremendous power to the
judges. The judges' learning and authority gave them power to revise
and develop doctrine. As Samuel Thorne wrote:
Sentences beginning "For it is an ancient maxim of the com-
mon law," followed by one of Coke's spurious Latin maxims
which he could manufacture to fit any occasion and provide
with an air of authentic antiquity, are apt to introduce a new
departure. Sentences such as "And by these differences and
reasons you will better understand your books," or "And so
the doubts and diversities in the books well resolved," likewise
indicate new law. 88
The great cases of Coke's era—brooded over for years by the King's
Bench and Common Pleas, while long lines of counsel argued and
reargued troublesome points—were referenda on statutes and doc-
trines. Butler and Baker's Case (1591) 87
 elucidated the Statute of Wills,
Chudleigh's Case (1595) 88
 ironed out the language of the Statute of
Uses, and Slade's Case (1602) 89
 broadened the availability of contract
actions. In Calvin's Case (1609), the judges handled a constitutional
matter too sensitive for Parliament, whether James Stuart's acces-
sion to the English throne gave his Scottish subjects the legal rights
of Englishmen. 90
Nor were great issues the only ones addressed. In Coke's own
publications, one finds a broad-fronted effort to move the law forward
in many different areas.. Under the guise of settling "diversities" (that
is, reconciling conflicting precedents or open questions; a way of
"Samuel Thorne, Address to the Selden Society, in Six EDWARD COKE 1552-1952, at 7
(1957).
S7 3 Co. Rep. 25a, 76 Eng. Rep. 684 (K.B. 1591).
881 Co. Rep. 1131), 76 Eng. Rep. 261 (KB. 1589-95).
89 4 Co. Rep. 91a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (KB. 1597-1602). John Baker's articles on this decision
offer what is probably the mast detailed analysis on how such disputations unfolded. See J.H.
Baker, New Light on Slade's Case, 29 CAMBRIDGE U. 51, 213 (1971).
80 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (KB. 1609). See generally David Martin Jones, Sir Edward
Coke and the Interpretation of Lawful Allegiance in Seventeenth Century England, 7 HisT. Pot-
Titoucirr 321 (1986); Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case, 9
YALE J.L. & Hum. . 73 (1997); Russell, supra note 12.
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proceeding which hid in plain sight the fact that new law was being
made), Queen Elizabeth's judges would define the time for perform-
ance of conditions, settle points of pleading and decide when tender-
ing back rent preserved a lessee's rights.9 '
As early as Bracton, England's judges had claimed that the com-
mon law was consonant with reason. What distinguishes Coke and his
age is the energy with which judges used reason to assert their control
over the law. Defining law as artificial reason gave tremendous author-
ity to the judges. It allowed them to review customs, ordinances and,
finally, statutes. What they found reasonable, the judges approved;
whatever failed to meet the test of reason, they struck down:
What was demanded . . . if English law [were] to exist as a
unified system was a technique of binding precedents. Some-
how, someone had to find a' principle that could be used to
survey the vast array of judicial "examples" that had been
accumulating since early medieval times and that would en-
able jurists to select those that could serve as broad prece-
dents. Coke provided it. His definition of law as "perfect
reason" became the standard against which the facts of law
were measured.92
Coke's own definition of reasonable shows how sharp a tool he had
found in this concept. Again glossing Littleton, he wrote:
"By reasonable time." This reasonable time shall be adjudged
by the discretion of the justices before whom the cause de-
pendeth; and so it is of reasonable fines, customs, and serv-
ices, upon the true state of the case depending before them:
for reasonableness in the cases belongeth to the knowledge
of the law, and therefore [it is] to be decided by the justices.
Quam longum esse debet non definitur in jure, sed pendet ex
91 See Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Co. Rep. 146a, 77 Eng. Rep. 695 (K.B. 1610); Crogale's Case,
8 Co. Rep. 66b, 77 Eng. Rep. 574 (K.B. 1608); Bothy's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 30b, 77 Eng. Rep. 298
(C.P. 1603); Ughtred's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 9a, 77 Eng. Rep. 525 (C.P. 1588).
In Lord Buckhurst's Case (1598), the lirst . case printed in the First Part of the Reports, Coke
reported the satisfactory resolution of a troubling diversity. See 1 Co. Rep. la, 76 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B.
1598). If A and B were jointly enfeoffed, with A being given the documents reflecting their title,
and A then died, his joint-tenant B (rather than A's heir) was to receive the deeds, Although
Coke stated that he printed this case first because it had been decided in the Chancery, the point
at issue was hardly earth-shaking. Possibly, Coke may have given this case such prominence
because it was so characteristic.
92John Underwood Lewis, Sir Edward Coke: His Theory of "Artificial Reason" as a Context for
Modern Basic Legal Theory, 84 Law Q, REV. 330, 386 (1968).
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discretione justitiariorum. And this being said of time, the like
may be said of things incertain, which ought to be reasonable;
for nothing that is contrary to reason, is consonant to law. 93
Here, even more than usual, Coke's gloss amplifies what Littleton
said. He extends the judges' authority; any aspect of a matter, not just
its timing, may be measured by its consonance with reason. Moreover,
Coke ties reason to the judges' learning and wisdom. (Bracton
might have referred to the judges' familiarity with the custom at
issue; Coke specifically treats the issue as "the knowledge of the law,"
a matter of the judges' learning.)
In Coke's rereading of Littleton, established doctrine is given a
cutting edge. Whatever is uncertain ought to be decided by reason. In
this context, this maxim is simply another way of saying that any
unresolved issue may be decided by the judges.
"It is better, saith the law," Coke wrote, "to suffer a mischief that is
peculiar to one, than an inconvenience that may prejudice many."94 It
was better "that a private person should be punished or damnified by
the rigor of the law, than a general rule of the law should be broken
to the general trouble and prejudice of many." 95 In Latin and in Law
French, inconvenient meant inconsistent. Coke continued: "Nihil quod
est inconveniens, est licitum. And the law, that is the perfection of reason,
cannot suffer anything that is inconvenient." 96
The ideas of avoiding inconvenience and explicitly preferring the
public interest appear throughout the cases which Coke reported.°
This suggests that there was something deliberate in the pressure
which Coke applied to the law. He preferred decisions that avoided
inconvenience—preferred decisions that swept broadly and promoted
overall consistency in the legal system—over decisions which carved
out individual exceptions for single cases. Treating law as the perfec-
tion of reason pushed inexorably toward perfecting the law through
the invocation of reason. Applying artificial reason meant polishing
out inconsistencies; that was part of adaptive change.
93 COKE, Co. Lrrr., supra note 2, at 56b.
94 Id. at 97b.
95 COKE, supra note 54, at 30.
96 COKE, Co. L=., supra note 2, at 97b.
97 See, e.g., Countess of Rutland's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 25b, 26a, 77 Eng. Rep. 89, 90 (KB. 1604);
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II. FROM ARTIFICIAL REASON TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
One of Coke's most important contributions to the history of the
law grows out of the energy of the Elizabethan courts. This contribu-
tion is judicial review, the idea that judges may invalidate statutes
passed by the legislature. Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case is supported
only tangentially by precedent, and it is settled on without great con-
cern for theory. What might seem its deficiencies only highlight the
confidence Coke reposed in the judges' skill and insight. The tradition
of judicial activism traces back through Marbury v. Madison to Bon-
ham's Case, decided by Coke's Common Pleas bench.
To believe that the law is the artificial reason of the judges is to
be blindly hostile to statutes, to be predisposed to invalidate them in
the name of the higher wisdom of the unwritten law. Rather, to believe
that the law is the artificial reason of the judges is to believe that judges
may apply, enlarge or eviscerate statutes to the same extent that they
review, uphold or revise the unwritten law.
A. Coke and Statutes
For all Coke's reputation as a master of the unwritten law, he
worked comfortably with statutes. 98 The law had three parts, he wrote—
common law, statute, and custom.99 To understand "what the body or
text of the common law is, and consequently where a man might find
it," Coke considered, the student should look to the statutes:
I do affirm, that the statutes of Magna Carta, Charta de
Foresta, Merton, Marlebridge, Westm' 1, De Bigamis, Glouc',
Westm' 2, Articuli super cartas, Articuli Cleri, Statutum Ebo-
raic', Praerogativa Regis, and some few others, that be ancient
amongst which, the statute of 25 Ed.3 is not to be omitted,
touching treasons (which for the most part are but declara-
tions of the common law) together with the original writs
contained in the Register concerning Common Pleas, and the
Case of Alton Woods, 1 Co. Rep. 40b, 53b, 76 Eng. Rep. 89, 120 (K.B. 1600); Wyat Wyld's Case,
8 Co. Rep. 78b, 79a, 77 Eng. Rep. 593, 594 (C.P. 1609); see also Agnes Corc's Case, 9 Co. Rep.
81a, 82a, 77 Eng. Rep. 853, 854 (K.B. 1611); Wade's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 114a, 114b, 77 Eng. Rep.
232, 233 (C.P. 1601); Henstead's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 10a, 10b, 77 Eng. Rep. 63, 64 (C.P. 1591).
99 See generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
99 See CouE, CO. LITT., supra note 2, at 115. The only distinction which Coke appeared to
draw here seems to relate to the issue of proof. "Acts of Parliament appear in the rolls of
Parliament, and for the most part arc in print," he continued. "Particular customs are to be
proved." Id.
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exact and true forms of indictments and judgments there-
upon in criminal causes, are the very body, and as it were the
very text of the common law of England.m
Indeed, Coke considered that Year Book cases and other reports of
judicial decisions were to be valued not only because they expressed
the common law, but also because such "book-cases and records are
also right commentaries, and true expositions of statutes and acts
of Parliament. "101
In selecting which cases to report, Coke asserted that he had
chosen decisions which elucidated recent statutes. The cases he
printed had been chosen "for the better understanding of the true
sense and reason of the judgments and resolutions formerly reported;
or for resolution of such doubts as therein remain undecided.'" 2
At the same time, Coke was deeply ambivalent toward the changes
which statutes produced. For all the changes he had witnessed or
engineered, he took a blithely, confidently conservative stance. What
others might have called reforms, he termed inventions or novelties.
His unruffled tone intimated that it was right, proper and inevitable
that the common law would absorb such disruptions:
Out of all [the] books and reports of the common law, I have
observed, that albeit some time by acts of Parliament, and
some time by invention and wit of man, some points of the
ancient common law have been altered or diverted from his
due course, yet in revolution of time, the same (as a most
skilful and faithful supporter of the commonwealth), have
been with great applause, for avoiding of many inconven-
iences, restored again. 103
1°°
 SIR EDWARD CORE, Preface to 8 REPORTS (1611). Coke's reliance on statutes is masked by
his introductory statement that "the grounds of our common law at this day [are] beyond the
memory or register of any beginning," which seems to locate the law's origins in the unknowable
British past. Id.
tot
102 com, Preface to 3 REPORTS, supra note 13. Coke went on to specify details:
[lin my former Reports 1 have reported and published for the explanation and
exposition of the statute of 23 H.8 c. 10 Porter's Case: of the broad spreading statute
of 27 H.8 c. 10 of uses, the cases of Chudleigh, Corbet, Shelley, Albany, and the
Lord Cromwell's Case: of the Statute of 34 H.8 cap. 20 of Recoveries, Wiseman's
Case; of the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 7 of Bankrupts, the Case of Bankrupts; of the
Statute of 34 H.8 cap. 21 of Confirmation of Letters Patent, Doddington's Case; of
the Statute of 31 H.8 of Dissolution of Monasteries, and of the Statute of 1 Ed. 6
of Chantrics, the Archbishop of Canterbury's Case; and of one branch of the great
and general statutes of 32 and 34 H.8 of Wilts, Bingham's Case.
Id.
LOS Id
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Elsewhere, Coke was clearer about why such innovations failed.
They were put down:
Commonly a new invention doth offend against many rules
and reasons (as it here appeareth) of the common law; and
the ancient judges and sages of the law have ever (as it
appeareth in our books) suppressed innovations and novel-
ties in the beginning, as soon as they have offered to creep
up, lest the quiet of the common law might be disturbed. 104
The ancient judges and sages were the same grave and learned men
upon whose wisdom the common law rested. Suppressing novelties
was part of fining and refining the law.m
Coke's comments on statutory law were broad, varying, and by no
means entirely consistent. His varying statements reflect different as-
pects of his continuing ambivalence. Sometimes Coke asserted that
statutes (Magna Carta in particular) were not new law, but only
reflected what the common law had always been.m6 The care which he
took in explaining the preambles to statutes suggests that he generally
viewed the growth of statute law as an attempt to deal with specific
problems.ml And he was alWays willing to praise a statute which resolved
a problem. He found good words, for example, for the Parliamentary
bill which put an end to the long-running litigation over title to the
lands of the Dean and Chapter of Norwich Cathedral.m In many cases,
CoKE, CO. Lrrr., supra note 2, at 379a-379b.
105 Cokc was by no means alone in these opinions. Sir John Dodderidge wrote that laws were
never in any kingdom totally altered without great danger of the evercion of the whole state." Sir
Francis Bacon, likewise, argued that "alteration of laws and customs" was one of the chief "causes
and motives of seditions." See EtuRGEss, supra note 6, at 23-24.
1 °G Magna Carta, Coke wrote, "was for the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of
the fundamental law of England, and for the residue it is additional to supply some defects of
the common law." Coma, Frame to 2 INSTITUTES, Supra note 7. moreover, by statute, Parliament
had adjudged that Magna Carta should be taken as the common law. See, id.; see also COKE, 2
1NsTrru-res, supra note 7, at 166 (Statute of Westminster I, on wrecks of the sea, declares common
law); id. at 567 (Artieurt Super Carlos made in affirmance of the common law).
107 See generally CostE, 2 INsTrrirrEs, supra note 7. If Coke believed that the common law
eternally triumphed over attempts to change it, he also portrayed the story of the law as an eternal
struggle by subjects to find ways around their sovereign's will. For example, he suggested that the
statute of Quo Warranto (1290) had been enacted because Edward 1 had tried to establish that
all franchises had to derive from a royal charter, only to be defeated by his subjects' stubborn
insistence that long possession alone gave a valid title. See id. at 495; see also T.F.T. PLUCKNETT,
LEGISLATION OF EDWARD 145-48 (1949).
This suggests that Coke was ultimately unconvinced that passing new laws could ever mean
true reform. However statutes might shift and alter the terrain, the human struggle which flowed
across it remained the same, the same struggle by bad men to evade the law and by able judges
to perfect and enforce it.
toe See Com, 3 INSTITUTES, supra note 11, at 191.
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where a statute had clearly wrought a revolution in the law—the Statute
of Uses or the Statute of Wills, for example—Coke matter-of-factly
treated such laws as what they were; landmarks dominating the legal
landscape. He did not attempt to argue that they declared the common
law. Instead, he focused on how the lawyer might negotiate the difficul-
ties which they posed.'°9
Significantly, all of these comments measure statutes by the tem-
plate of the common law. To focus on the practical, technical issues
which a statute posed was to transfer to statutory interpretation a
perspective attained in applying common-law doctrine. Statutes which
addressed single issues could be likened to judicial decisions which
resolved diversities. Statutes which declared or restored the common
law could be treated as the functional equivalent of the common law.
In all these ways, long before Bonham's Case, Coke implicitly subjected
the written law to what Samuel Thorne has called "the customary
process of juridical logic," the same process by which the judges con-
trolled and policed the unwritten law."°
B. The Equity of the Statute
Bonham's Case was not the first occasion when Coke showed him-
self willing to subordinate the written law to the wisdom of the judges.
Years before he struck down a statute, Coke had experimented with
the idea of using traditional means of statutory interpretation to ex-
pand judicial authority.
Coke's ambivalence toward statutes showed most intensely in his
dissatisfaction with one particular statute, De Donis Conditionalibus
("De Donis") (1285)."' Not coincidentally, De Donis was a statute that
Coke was willing-to rewrite through interpretation, by taking advantage
of "the equity of the statute." Coke's distrust of De Donis and his
willingness to reshape doctrine were the two sides of a coin. Taken
together, they prefigure his assertion of the judges' right to control the
written law.
Long before Coke, common lawyers had been familiar with a way
of broadening a statute's application. Since the days of the Year Books,
judges had recognized the doctrine of "the equity of the statute." This
was a power of interpretation, based on a "construction reasonable-
109 See, e.g., Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25a, 36a-36b, 76 Eng. Rep. 684, 709-10 (K.B.
1591) (advice on preparing a will).
110
 See Samuel Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 U. ILL. L. Rev. 202, 211
(1936).
111
 13 Edw., Statute of Westminster 11, ch. 1 (1285).
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ment," .which allowed judges to apply a law to factual situations which
were not within its actual letter."' A statute specifying the warden of
the Fleet Prison might be read to refer to other gaolers; a statute giving
rights to life tenants and tenants for years might be extended to cover
tenants holding for half a year.us
The equity of the statute was not judicial review. It did not even
support far-ranging judicial activism. However much the doctrine
promised, it was strictly limited by tradition-minded judges. Case law
consistently refused to apply statutory equity to penal laws or statutes
which abrogated the common law. 'The general attitude . . . is one of
jealousy for the common law which was not to be modified by statute
more than could be avoided," Samuel Thorne wrote, "thus a statute
which inflicts a penalty upon malefactors in parks [would] not extend
to malefactors in forests."" 4
The question of whether royal courts could protect copyhold
tenants' rights (an issue gradually resolved in the copyholders' favor
over decades of case-by-case litigation) was one of the great, recurring
questions of Coke's age. An issue which often surfaced in such cases
was whether De Donis, which by its terms applied only to freehold
estates, could be extended to copyhold interests. 115 De Donis made
possible entailed estates by forbidding the alienation, in perpetuity, of
lands transferred in fee tail. The only way to bar the entail and allow
such family property to be sold was by sham lawsuits and judicially-sanc-
tioned fraudulent transfers via common vouchers and common recov-
eries. ' 16
Coke was of counsel in several landmark cases on copyhold, in-
cluding Hilt v. Morse (1585),h 17 Bullen v. Grant (1589) "8 and Gravenor
v. Todd (1593)." 9 In all these cases, the issue was whether De Donis
applied to copyholds; in the last, the arguments probed whether the
statute's history could justify a liberal reading of its terms. In the same
period, in a different area of the law, Coke was wrestling with the
problems which entails posed for freehold estates. Sometimes he
' 12 See Y.B. 4 Hen. 7, Trin. 6 (1489), cited in Thorne, supra note 110, at 206.
"3 See ThOrne, supra note 110, at 210; BAKER, supra note 80, at 240, citing Plat v. Sheriff of
London, 1 Plowden 35, 75 Eng. Rep. 57 (Ex. 1550).
''Thorne, supra note 110, at 208, 213, citing Y.B. 21 Hen. 7, Pasch. 8 (1506).
115 See CHARLES M, GRAY, COPYI1OLD, EQUITY, AND THE COMMON LAW 109-21 (1963).
. 110 See BAKER, supra note 80, at 318-20. On the muddled draftsmanship of De Donis, and
how the perpetually enduring entail was created by the judges' refinement of the statute rather
than the statutory text, see PLocitivErr, supra note 107, at 131-35.
"42 Moore 188, 72 Eng. Rcp. 523 (K.B. 1585).
II8 Cro. Eliz. 148, 78 Eng. Rep. 406 (KB. 1589).
' 19 4 Co. Rep. 23a, 76 Eng. Rep. 922 (KB. 1593).
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worked his way through the melee of a lawsuit, seeking to convince the
court that the estate his client possessed was truly a fee simple.' 2° At
other times, feeling his way carefully, he mapped out inch by inch the
course which an estate plan should follow, across a minefield of litiga-
tion risks. 121
From this background, Coke emerged with a thorough loathing
for De Donis. He wasted no opportunity to denounce it. "Infinite were
the scruples, suits, and inconveniences" which De Donis had intro-
duced, Coke wrote: 122
When all estates were fee simple, then were purchasers sure
of their purchases, farmers of their leases, creditors of their
debts, the king and lords had their escheats, forfeitures, ward-
ships and other profits of their seigniories: and for these and
other like cases, by the wisdom of the common law all estates
of inheritance were fee simple; and what contentions and
mischiefs have crept into the quiet of the law by these fettered
inheritances, daily experience teacheth us. 123
Perhaps because of this practice experience, Coke connected De
Donis with the doctrine of the equity of the statute. Certain passages
in his writing make this clear. Early in the Commentary Upon Littleton,
addressing a passage in which Littleton discussed entails and De Donis,
Coke broke into a long discussion of judicial equity, how the "construc-
tion made by the judges" could stretch the reach of a statute beyond
its literal terms.'" Nothing in Littleton's text called for so long an
explanation of equity at this juncture. This suggests that the connec-
tion was personal. Reflexively, Coke made the leap from his frustration
In E.g., Smith v. Haws, Cro. Eliz. 96, 78 Eng. Rcp. 355 (KB. 1588).
12 I Between 1584 and 1592, Coke helped draft an estate plan for Henry, 9th Baron Scrope.
The Compleat Clerke, a 17th Century manual providing forms for conveyancing, includes an estate
settlement drafted by Coke (among others) for the family of Henry, 9th Baron Scrape. Internal
evidence shows that this was drafted between 1584 and 1592. (Prof. Thomas G. Barnes brought
this to light in his introduction to the Legal Classics edition of Commentary Upon Littleton.) See
Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to COKE, CO. Lrrr., supra note 2, at 9. However, in the late 1580s,
no matter how careful the planning had been, Coke went to court in a lawsuit between claimants
to Lord Scrope's estate. See Ross and Morrice's Case, 2 Leon. 23, 74 Eng. Rep. 326 (KB. 1588).
Further research may establish whether this was collusive litigation, meant to give a questionable
settlement the seal of judicial approval, or whether the estate plan blew up in the draftsmen's
faces. Either of these scenarios could only have deepened Coke's skepticism of De Donis's value.
In Cotta, Preface to 4 REPORTS, supra note 27.
I " COKE, Co. L=., supra note 2, at 19a; see also Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep.
40a, 40a-40b, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 313 (KB. '1605) (De Donis upset true policy of common law).
124 Com., CO. L=., supra note 2, at 24b.
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with this statute to a doctrine which offered the possibility of rewriting
statutory text.
Beyond this, Coke looked to more forceful ways of dealing with
written law. He found that earlier judges had construed De Donis
"according to the rule and reason of the common law, and that in
divers and sundry variable manners." t 25 Through different interpreta-
tions of the same statutory phrases, some alienations had been voided,
some found merely voidable, all in the discretion of the sages of the
law.
Coke's exasperation with De Donis echoed in the tenor of his
remarks about statutory law. As early as 1600, Coke spoke with conde-
scension, even contempt, of legislative draftsmanship. Great questions
of the common law, he wrote, "oftentimes" arose "upon Acts of Parlia-
ment overladen with provisoes and additions, and many times on a
sudden penned or corrected by men of none or very little judgment
in law.ni26
Given this background, it is hardly surprising that one of Coke's
first attempts to assert the judges' authority over written law would
involve De Donis. It is equally unsurprising that Coke would seek to
apply the doctrine of statutory equity more broadly across the law.
Coke resented De Donis and looked toward statutory equity as a way
of correcting its defects. Where other statutes shared its shortcomings,
where they had been suddenly or clumsily penned by the unlearned,
it was only natural to apply the same remedy.
When Coke wrote the preface to the First Part of his Reports, he
was carrying in his manuscript notebooks his notes on what had been
decided in Heydon's Case. This was an Exchequer decision of 1584 that
Coke would not publish until 1602. Sometime during the interim,
Coke evidently decided to use his report of the decision to break with
the crabbed, literalistic tradition of statutory interpretation.
Heydon's Case involved the question of whether De Donis applied
to certain copyhold properties, formerly monastic properties. The case
is remembered, however, for what it held about statutory interpreta-
tion. Coke wrote that the judges had announced four rules "for the
sure and true interpretation of all statute[s]." The procedure was to
consider what the common law had been, where the common law had
fallen short and what remedy Parliament had provided, and finally "the
true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always
to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance
'" Id. at 327a-327b.
I" COKE, Preface to '2 REPORTS, supra note S4.
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the remedy . . . according to the true intent of the makers of the Act,
pro bono publico."'"
These resolutions amounted to a new standard. Without giving
the judges absolute carte blanche, Coke was urging that they follow
the sense of a statute rather than limit themselves to its actual words.
This was a liberal (but not revolutionary) broadening of judicial
power.' 28
 Even so, this is one of the junctures at which Coke pushed
the law. The neat four-part test which he says the Exchequer adopted
does not appear in other reports of this decision. The enduring "mis-
chief rule" of statutory interpretation, for which Heydon's Case remains
known to English courts today, seems to reflect only the casual dictum
of Chief Baron Manwood, reported by Coke as settled law.'" As John
Baker has noted: "It is easy to sympathize with Coke's desire to present
such an attractive statement as a 'resolution' by the judges"—but the
textual record suggests that Coke's report went beyond the judges'
holding.'"
In the name of judicial reason, Coke was willing to rewrite the law.
He had pushed to its broadest ambit (perhaps beyond) the doctrine
of the equity of the statute. He had noted where the judges had silently
amended De Donis. In 1602, his chief way of shaping the law was in
the way he reported it. The appointment which came to him five years
later, to the chief justiceship of the Common . Pleas, would give his
ambition greater scope.
C. judicial Review of Government Bodies
Under Elizabeth and James, the central courts took an increas-
ingly active role in the work of government. Immemorially, royal judges
'27 Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
' YS
 As Samuel Thorne .explained, the holding in Heydon's Case was "much closer to what
courts were groping toward by means of the equity of the statute: an understanding of the ratio
legisrather,than the ratio verborum, an effort to make the interpretation of statutes ... something
more than merely a grammatical exercise." Thorne, supra note 110, at 215.
'According to Coke's manuscript notes, Chief Baron Manwood's original words seem to
have been these:
And he said that he did not take any certain ground for the construction of statutes,
be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law, but only to
consider the mischief which was before the statute and the remedy which the
parliament intended to provide, and upon this to make construction to repress the
mischief and to advance the remedy according to the intent of parliament.
J.H. Baker, Coke's Notebooks and the Sources of 1-lis Reports, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 59, 76 (1972)
(Baker's translation from British Library MS. Harl. 6687).
IN Baker uncovered this in his comparison of Coke's manuscript notes of this case, which
make clear the casual nature of this comment and the case as printed in the Reports, where these
comments appear as a full-fledged rule. See id.
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had supervised the shires, supporting the work of the justices of the
peace. Now, however, the judges increasingly asserted the right to
review and correct the work of other municipal bodies. In 1599, in
Rooke v. Withers, the King's Bench held that "the rule of reason and
law" limited the Commissioners of Sewers' power to assess taxes to pay
for draining marshlands. 19 ' Coke reported this decision; later, as a
judge, he would further limit the Commissioners' powers.'" Froin the
courts on which Coke sat, an increasing number of prohibitions went
out barring prerogative and ecclesiastical courts from hearing cases
which common-law courts could decide.'" At the same time, expansive
new readings of the writ of habeas corpus gave judges new powers to
intervene outside the court system.'" Coke was neither the first judge
nor the last to issue prohibitions or feud with the Chancery, but his
decisions raised the pitch of the debate. No prior judge had dared to
free prisoners committed by the Lord Chancellor or suggested that the
common-law courts could prohibit the Chancery itself from hearing a
case.'"
Using the writ of mandamus, the common-law courts began to re-
view the actions of municipal governments.'" The high-water mark of
this movement came in Bagg's Case (1615). In this case, Coke aggres-
sively announced:
[F]irst, it was resolved, that to this Court of King's Bench
belongs authority, not only to correct errors in judicial pro-
ceedings, but other errors and misdemeanors extra-judicial,
tending to the breach of peace, or oppression of the subjects,
or to the raising of faction, controversy, debate, or any man-
ner of misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either
public or private, can be done but that it shall be (here)
reformed or punished by due course of law.'"
161 5 Co. Rep. 99b, I00a, 77 Eng. Rep. 209, 210 (C.P. 1599).
132 See Louis L. Jaffe & Edith C. Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law Histoti cat
Origins, 72 L.Q. REV. 345 (1956).
1 " See BAKER, supra DOW 80, at 166; see 1.11S0 CHARLES M. GRAY, THE WRIT OF PRODIRITION:
JURISDICTION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE (1994).
"4 See Baker, supra note 80, at 168-69.
I" See J.H. Baker, The Common Lawyers and the Chancery: 1616, 4 hum JURIST (n.s.) 368,
374-78 (1969); John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere Disinte, ad: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616,
36 U. ILL. L. REV. 127 (1936).
"6 See RAKER, supra note 80, at 169-70.
1" 11 Co. Rep. 93h, 98a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1277-78 (K.B. 1615). Thomas Egerton, Lord
Ellesmere, felt that Coke had gone Lou far with this decision: "In giving excess of authority to the
King's Bench he cloth . . . insinuate that this court is all sufficient in itself to manage the state
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These lines of decisions bounded government in all its aspects,
subordinating all of the king's other servants to the authority of the
judges. Ineluctably, the authority of the judges would also be meas-
ured against the authority of the king's loyal subjects, the peers and
commons of England, sitting in Parliament.
III. COKE APPLIES THE POWER OF THE COMMON LAW
A. Thomas Bonham and the Royal College of Physicians
Thomas Bonham was a medical practitioner in London. He held
a bachelor's degree from Cambridge, and seems to have held an M.D.
from that university as well. As early as 1602, he was associated with
surgeons who practiced in the capital, and as early as 1605, he had
begun to have trouble with the Royal College of Physicians. The Col-
lege was authorized, by statutes passed under Henry VIII, to fine any
person who practiced medicine in London without being licensed by
the College. The College was also authorized to govern the medical
community of London. A second clause in the statute allowed it to
punish malpractice with powers including the ability to fine and im-
prison.'"
In 1605 and 1606, the College denied Bonham's application for
membership and then fined him when he continued to practice. In
November 1606, after Bonham defiantly told the College's comitia
censorum that the body had no authority to regulate medical practice
by university graduates, the College jailed him. Within a week, however,
Bonham was released. His attorney had obtained a writ of habeas carpus
from the Common Pleas, over which ChiefJustice Coke presided.
In May 1607, at an informal conference held at the house of
Thomas Egerton, Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, six judges agreed that
the College had the right to govern all medical practitioners in Lon-
don, even those holding university degrees. Thus encouraged, in early
1608, the College sued Bonham in the Court of King's Bench, seeking
... as if the King's Bench had a superinterdependency over the government itself." KNAELA, supra
note 9, at 307-08.
193 The most detailed history of the litigation between Bonham and the College is supplied
in Harold J. Cook, Against Common Right and Reason: The Royal College of Physicians Versus Doctor
Thomas Bonham, 29 Am..). LEGAL HIST. 301 (1985), upon which the following discussion draws.
See generally Raoul Berger, Doctor Bonham's Case: Statutory Construction or Constitutional The-
ory?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 521 (1969); Charles M. Gray, Bonham's Case Reviewed, 116 PROC. AM.
Putt.. Soc'y 35 (1972).
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a fine of sixty pounds. Bonham then countersued in the Common
Pleas (in his turn, seeking one hundred pounds damages for false
imprisonment). In early 1609, the King's Bench found Bonham guilty
of illicit practice. In 1610, however, the Common Pleas ruled that the
College lacked the power to punish Bonham—setting Bonham free,
and levying a forty-pound fine against the College.
Coke offered five reasons for freeing Bonham. One drew on the
lex talionis. Coke suggested that only the doctor whose malpractice
harmed his patient should himself be punished "in his body," i.e., be
jailed; the physician whose sole fault was unauthorized practice might
be punished in some other way, but not through imprisonment.'"
Three other reasons were essentially technical, close readings of the
two relevant statutory clauses: Coke found that the first clause, the one
under which Bonham had been prosecuted, did not authorize the
College to imprison him (a power available only for prosecutions
under the second clatise)."°
The last reason (fourth of the five, as Coke marshalled them) was
the one holding the gunpowder. Referring expressly to the first clause,
authorizing action by the College, Coke struck this down because it
allowed the College to retain half of the fines it imposed on unauthor-
ized practitioners:
The censors cannot be judges, ministers, and parties: judges
to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons;
and parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture, quia aliquis
non debet esse Index in prapria causa, imo iniquum est aliquem
suae rei esse judicem . . . And it appears in our books, that in
many cases, the common law will control acts of Parliament,
and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an
act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law
will control it, and adjudge such act to be void."
To support his conclusion, Coke cited four cases, precedents which
were less than truly compelling. In one, Tregor's Case, Coke elabo-
I " SEE Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 117b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C,?. 1610).
140 The differences in sanction showed that the clauses were distinct and parallel. If they were
read as linked, they would improperly give the College power to punish twice for the same offense.
Moreover, the first clause allowed fines to be imposed only after one month of unlicensed
practice, while the second clause allowed immediate action for malpractice.
RI Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. On the history of the cited maxim,
sec D.E.C. Yale, ludex in Propria Causa: An Historical Excursus, 33 CAMBRIDGE U. 80 (1974).
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rately misquoted the text; only what he added suggested that the
common law might override a statute." 2
 In another, the court had
considered, but not actually ruled on, the conflict caused when
statute law and canon law prescribed different rules for custody of
monastery seals.'" In the third decision, Stroude's Case, the court did
nothing more than clarify that the statutory phrase rent service also
meant rent charge." 4
Only one precedent squarely supported Coke: a Year Book case,
dating back more than three centuries, in which the court had refused
to allow a plaintiff to maintain an action allowed by statute."' In this
decision (and some closely related cases, also decided under the Plan-
tagenets), common-law judges had refused to give effect to the text of
statutes. Nonetheless, as T.F.T. Plucknett noted:
The courts in these cases did undoubtedly "disregard the
plain meaning of an Act of Parliament"; but in telling the
story Lord Coke has made the important addition of the
words "because it would be against common right and reason,
the common law adjudges the said act of parliament as to that
point void." There is no judgment as this in the report; the
statute is not held void; it is just ignored. To this fact Coke has
really added an explanation and a theory all his own."'
If the theory and the explanation were Coke's own, so too was the
reading of the case law—decisions which he strained to the break-
ing point."' In voiding a statute, Coke was breaking new ground.
H2 Y.B. 8 Edw. 3, Pasch. 26 (1335). The most rigorous analysis of these precedents remains
that of Theodore Plucknett. See Theodore Plucknett, Bonham's Cagy and judicial Review, 40
HARV. L. REV. 30 (1926). Italicizing what Coke added to Tregor's Case shows how much he added:
"Herle saith some statutes are made against law and right, which those who made them perceiving,
would not put them into execution." Id. at 35.
149 See Plucknett, supra note 142, at 36-37 (citing ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, Annuitie 41, in
NATURA BREVIUM (1553); NICHOLAS STATIIAM, Annuitie II, in ABRIDGEMENT (circa 1490)).
114 1 Anderson 45, 123 Eng. Rep. 345, 3 Leon. 58, 74 Eng. Rep. 539, 4 Leon. 40, 74 Eng.
Rep. 715 (C.P. 1575).
"5 See Plucknett, supra note 142, at 45 (citing HERBERT, Cessavit 42, in NATURA BREVIUM,
supra note 143).
146 Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
147
 Significantly, of Coke's four brethren on the Common Pleas bench, only one was per-
suaded by his reasoning. Two dissented, and it seems that Justice Warburton gave Coke his 3-2
majority only because he concurred in the outcome.
Coke hinted at moderation, suggesting that the common law might usually "control" statutes
and only "sometimes" adjudge them void. Coke's statement that judges would strike down
"repugnant" law, however, gave the lie to this. In Coke's lexicon, repugnant meant "contrary to
common law." See COKE, CO. LtTr., supra note 2, at 206b (legal conditions "repugnant to the
state" equated with conditions "against some maxim or rule in law").
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Rather than rely on the judges' power to construe a statute, he
reached out to assert that they held this fundamental authority.
It cannot be denied, in the end, that Coke acted in the belief that
courts could strike down statutes which offended the common law—
that is, which the judges in their wisdom found unreasonable.'" Nor
can it be denied that Coke understood fully what he was doing. He
wrote out the relevant passage from Bonham's Case, in two different
manuscripts, in his own hand—a fact that suggests he understood what
his words might unleash.' 49
Any doubts as to Coke's intentions were dispersed in 1612, when
the Common Pleas decided Rowles v. Mason.'" Without citing Bon-
ham's Case, Coke used Rowles to reiterate that the common law "cor-
rects, allows, and disallows both statute law and custom, for if there be
repugnancy in a statute; or unreasonableness in custom, the common
law disallows and rejects it.""' In this same year, Coke handed down
another decision which reaffirmed the judge's power. In Mary Port-
ington's Case,' 52 he ruled that entailed estates (made possible by De
Donis) could be barred by the use of common recoveries, no matter
what form such perpetuities took. Coke did not claim that the common
law could control statutes, he did not announce that the provisions of
De Donis were repugnant or void; rather, he gave whole-hearted judi-
cial sanction to evasions of the statute. When he praised common
recoveries, hailing them as crucial to landholders' rights, he deni-
grated De Donis in a back-handed way. To privilege common recoveries
implied that De Donis was against public policy. This was a subtler
assertion of judicial power than Bonham's Case had offered, but it
1411 Even Samuel Thorne, who argued ably that Coke did not base Bonham's Case on a theory
of judicial review, acknowledged that "judges had wide powers of statutory interpretation, but
Coke's disregard of the express words of the Act probably went beyond them." Samuel E. Thorne,
Doctor Bonham's Case, 54 L.Q. Rzv. 543, 551 (1958). And as R. A. McKay observed, the decision
is ultimately predicated upon an idea of fundamental law. If Coke reached his result by strictly
construing the statute, nonetheless, "the only reason for the existence of this power is to bring
the statutes into general conformity with the fundamental law." R. A. McKay, Cake—Parliamentary
Supremacy or the Supremacy of the Law?, 22 Mimi. L. REV. 215, 250 (1924).
142 These passages arc found in Cambridge University MS. Ii.2.21 2, to. 93v, and the manuscript
formerly known as Yale Law Library MS. G.R24.1, fo. 157v. This manuscript is now in Yale
University's Beinecke Library.
15°2 Brownlow 192, 198, 123 Eng. Rep. 892, 895 (C.P. 1612).
151 Id. Even after 1613, when Coke was transferred to. the King's Bench, the Common Pleas
continued to follow the path he had set. The principles of Bonham's Case were followed by Sir
Henry Hobart, Coke's successor as chief justice of Common Pleas. In Lord Sheffeild v. Ratcliffe,
Hobart even expanded on Coke; he spoke of "that liberty and authority that judges have over
laws, especially over statute laws, ... to mould them to the truest and hest use." Hobart 334, 346,
80 Eng. Rep. 475, 486 (EX. 1615).
152 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976 (K.B. 1614). For further discussion, see supra notes
78-79, 122-30 and accompanying text.
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arrogated just as much power to the bench: judicial authority, once
again, effectively controlled and voided a statute.
B. Coke Refuses to Recant
Bonham's Case was controversial in its day, possibly as controversial
as any other case in which judges have invalidated any law. Coke's
decision drew criticism from his opponents and displeasure from his
king. Where there is pressure, there is resistance. Coke steadfastly
refused to take back what he had written. His refusal to recant followed
through on what he had held; he had asserted the superiority of the
judges' wisdom, and now he maintained that. His steadfast assertion
of judicial independence bore witness to his assertion of judicial su-
premacy.
After Bonham's Case was published, Coke came under fire for its
holding. Coke's rivals saw very clearly what the decision meant. Lord
Chancellor Ellesmere noted the decision with special emphasis in his
criticism of Coke's Reports. Ellesmere wrote that Bonham's Case
derogateth much from the wisdom and power of the parlia-
ment, that when the three estates—the King, the Lords and
the Commons—have spent their labors in making a law, then
shall three judges on the bench destroy and frustrate all their
points because the act agreeth not in their particular sense
with common right and reason, whereby [Coke] advanceth
the reason of a particular court above the judgment of all the
realm . . . . For it . is Magis Congruum that acts of parliament
should be corrected by the same pen that drew them, rather
than to be dashed in pieces by the opinion of a few judges.'"
Nor can it be said that Coke held back from the dispute. When he
published Bonham's Case, he added what might have seemed an
innocuous postscript. The case was one of first impression; he wrote,
153 1CsrAFLA, supra note 9, at 306-07. Ellesmere stood for the authority of the Chancery as
fiercely as Coke asserted the power of the common-law courts. More than that, he was Coke's
peer at the bar, fully competent to judge the quality of Coke's lawyering. His comments thus show
not only the assertiveness of Coke's statement in Bonham's Case, but also indicate that this
assertiveness lacked foundation.
Mir were Coke's friends slow or reluctant to read Bonham's Case as a ground-breaking
decision. In another .
 Jacobean case, Rouswell u Ivory, argued in the Chancery in 1619, Serjeant
Ranulph Crewe, Coke's friend and kinsman, cited Bonham's Case as holding that common-law
judges might overrule statutes, and argued that the Chancellor likewise might overrule acts of
Parliament. See Gray, supra note 138, at 51-53. Rouswell u Ivory is reported in aritish Museum
Lansdowne MS. 1080, 40b ff., Trinity 16 jatnes 1.
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"the first judgment on the said branch concerning fine and impris-
onment which has been given since the making of the said charter
and Acts of Parliament, and therefore I thought it worthy to be
reported and published."'"
To those who knew Coke well, this postscript was not innocuous.
When Coke took a controversial stance, he typically offered a transpar-
ently disingenuous explanation. When he held that the High Commis-
sion could not administer the ex officio oath to Puritan dissidents, he
asserted that he did so out of regard for the examinees' souls; to let
the oath be administered might tempt them to perjury.'" Asked to
explain why the Chancery was a lower court than King's Bench, he
stated that the blazon of the King's Bench was the true royal insignia,
while the blazon of the Chancery was that of a cadet branch.
As Christopher Hill has noted, Coke made such suggestions with
"naive cunning." Superficially, such statements were soft and conven-
tional enough to turn away wrath. In . fact, because these explanations
were so patently insufficient, they raised the pitch of the controversy.
Coke was playing dumb in order to goad his opponents; to give an
obviously false explanation only underlined the obstinacy (or arro-
gance) with which he held his position. Coke's closing words on Bon-
ham's Case are of a piece with other such challenges. He was not
printing the case because it was the first to explicate the statute—as
everyone knew. He was printing the case because it struck down the
statute—as everyone knew.
The dispute over Bonham's Case was only one of the factors which
cost Coke his sovereign's confidence. He had carried on a lifelong feud
with Sir Francis Bacon, who now served as Attorney-General and held
the ear of King James. He had simultaneously pressed a second feud
with Ellesmere, a dying lion who roused himself for one final battle.
Between them, Bacon and Ellesmere brought Coke down.' 57
154 Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. at 121a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 658.
155 Of Oaths Before an Ecclesiastical judgC Ex Officio, 12 Cu. Rep. 26, 26, 77 Eng. Rep, 1308,
1308-09 (K.13. 1607), discussed in Berman, supra note 6, at 1682-84; see also Rormvri G. USHER,
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HIGH COMMISSION (Oxford Univ. Press 1968) (1913); Mary H.
Maguire, Attach of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio as Administered in the Ecclesiastical
Courts of England, in ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY IN HONOR OF CIIARLES HOWARD
MchmAiN 199 (C.F. Wittke ed., 1936).
156 See CHRISTOPHER HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND 404-
05 (1964).
157 His discharge as chief justice, Coke bitterly noted, had been "procured by the importunity
and labor of Egerton, Lord Chancellor, and Bacon, Attorney [General]." Historical Manuscripts
Commission, supra note 28, at 873 (marginalia in Holkham MS. 727). This may oversimplify. By
88	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 39:43
In the summer of 1616, when Coke would ordinarily have ridden
the assize circuit, he was ordered to "reform" his Reports, "wherein
there be many dangerous conceits of his own uttered for law."' 58 If
James expected that he would recant, Coke did not. He again played
dumb. After three months, he declared that he could identify only five
"animadversions" in his eleven volumes of cases:
[1] n the prince's case he had found out:the French statute,
which was "filz aisne," whereas the Latin was "primogenitus;"
and so the prince is duke of Cornwall in French, and not duke
of Cornwall in Latin. And another was, that he had set Mon-
tagu to be chief justice in Henry VIII's time, when it should
have been in Edward VI's, and such other stuff . . . . 159
This was defiance, and James took up the gauntlet. If Coke would
admit only five trifling errors, he would demand that his obstinate
Chief Justice explain five of his most dangerous conceits, chief
among them his opinions in Bonham's Case and Bagg's Case. Again,
Coke refused to take back what he had said. On Bagg's Case he
yielded very little.' 5° On Bonham's Case, he yielded nothing. He had
made no new law, he asserted; he had only related "such authorities
of law, as had been adjudged and resolved in ancient and former
times, and were cited in the argument" of the case. "(A] nd there-
fore the words of my book are these, 'It appeareth in our books,
that in many cases the common law shall control acts of parliament,
and sometimes shall adjudge them to be utterly void . . . ."' 81
Coke seemed to deflect responsibility, to say that what he had held
was only what the law required. If this answer was not the recantation
which James had sought, it also seemed studiously non-objectionable.
this time, Coke had worn out King James's patience; he had failed to defer to the crown's view
of its prerogative powers and right to out-of-court consultation on pending cases. He had worked
to restrict the powers of prerogative courts. He was at odds with the Church of England; he had
perpetuated the friction between common-law courts and ecclesiastical tribunals. He had squab-
bled with the Duke of Buckingham over a choice bit of political patronage—which, given the
Duke's place as royal favorite, may have been the last straw. See also KNAFLA, supra note 9, al
123-81; Baker, supra note 80, at 368-92; Dawson, supra note 135, at 127-52.
155 2 SIR FRANCIS BACON, WORKS 500 (n.p., Basil Montagu ed., Hart, Carey & Hart 1853).
159 13 SIR FRANCIS BACON, WORKS 352 (n.p., Basil Montagu ed., William Pickering Co. 1831).
150
 Coke restated his opinion without clarifying it. He stated that he had claimed for the
King's Bench the power to correct the "misgovernance" of Inferior magistrates," without clarify-
ing further which magistrates were inferior to King's Bench. See id. at 376-77.
Clearly the burgesses of Plymouth, whose actions were reviewed and corrected in Bagg's Case,
ranked below the King's Bench justices. To Coke, however, even the Chancery might be inferior
to the King's Bench. That was a point at issue and that was a point which Coke's answer left open.
161 1d. at.373.
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Nonetheless, coded into Coke's language may have been a stronger
answer, at once more subtle and more defiant. 162
 On Coke's tomb, the
Latin epitaph would say dum vixit bibliotheca viva, one who while he
lived was a living library. If this epitaph offers any sort of self-portrait,
if the learned judge was a counterpart of the texts he had studied, Coke
may have claimed responsibility while seeming to deny it. The textual
authority of the precedents meshed with the personal authority of the
judge. The books which controlled in Bonham's Case may have in-
cluded the learning which Coke carried, bibliotheca viva, within his
human frame.
C. The Fall and Rise of judicial Review
The idea of judicial review gradually petered out in England, and
was dead by the end of the seventeenth century. Sir William Blackstone
buried the doctrine, using words which have an oddly modern ring:
I know it is generally laid down more largely, that acts of
parliament contrary to reason are void. But if the parliament
will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable,
I know of no power ... to control it: and the examples usually
alleged in support of this sense of the rule do none of them
prove, that, where the main , object of a statute is unreason-
able, the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to set
the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would
be subversive of all government.' 63
When he passed this judgment, Blackstone was an Oxford don; he
had not yet been picked for the bench. He would always live farther
162 In his institutional writings, Coke did not repeat, but did not retract, what he had said in
Bonham's Case. He did not mention lionham's Case when he discussed the powers of Parliament,
as logic might have demanded. He referred to the case four times, however: once when discussing
the powers of the College of Physicians, three times in discussing cases in which courts ignored
statutes or interpreted them to meet the test of underlying fundamental law. See SIR EDWARD
COKE, FOURTH PART or THE INSTITUTES or TUE LAWS Or ENGLAND 251 (William S. Hein Co.
1986) (1797 ed.); Com, 2 INSTITUTES, supra note 7, at 402, 561, 588. If Coke held back from
recapitulating the doctrine he had set loose—he had already been sent to the Tower once, and
he may have rightly feared that a second confinement would kill him—he nonetheless took care
to ensure that its implications would not be missed. See alsojAmEs R. STONER, COMMON Lim AND
LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, I -IOBBEs, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 48 (1992).
In Britain, emphasis has focused on indications that Coke later changed his mind, and came
to believe that what Parliament passed, the judges could not question. See BAKER, supra note 80,
at 242 (citing SIR EDWARD COKE, FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
37, 41 (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1797 ed.)).
165 SOt WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *91 (1st ed. 1765).
90	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 39:43
from the political world than had Coke. He spoke first of reasonable
statutes, second of the power of the judges, and he rejected his great
predecessor's boldest constitutional declaration.
On the American mainland, by contrast, the idea of judicial review
had already taken hold. As early as 1647, the General Court of Massa-
chusetts had ordered copies of Coke's Reports and his Commentary
Upon Littleton.'m By the end of the century, judicial authorities had
begun to invalidate legislation which violated "fundamental law in
nature."'" In 1772, as rebellion and revolution began to kindle in
Virginia, several individuals of Indian descent asked the courts to strike
down a statute which made them slaves. In their arguments, the plain-
tiffs drew on the authority of both God and man:
IA111 acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural right
and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in the nature of
things, considered as void. The laws of nature are the laws of
God; whose authority can be superseded by no power on
earth . . . . Such have been the adjudications of our courts of
justice. And cited 8 Co. 118a Bonham's Case.' 66
In 1772, John Marshall was seventeen. Robin v. Hardaway arose in
the commonwealth he knew, not that far from his native Fauquier
County. Around this time, Marshall's father bought him a copy of
Blackstone's Commentaries, but for some reason the boy did not take
to it.' 67
 He may have taken more interest in ideas like those put
forward in Robin. The decision, after all, was reported by his cousin,
Thomas Jefferson.
The idea that judges could strike down unjust laws was now a
tradition, deep-rooted in the country. With Marshall and Jefferson
emerged the dramatis personae who would play out the conflict on a
new, broader stage.
The idea behind Bonham's Case, the "theory" upon which Coke
based judicial review, is his belief that common law, statute and custom
were the three parts of the law. This understanding ranks together
judicial doctrines, legislative enactments and popular practice. All
three of these realms are treated as subjects which the judge must
164
 See Plucknett, supra note 142, at 61-62 (citing HILKEY, LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COLO-
NIAL MASSACHUSETTS 66 (1910)).
165 See Giddings v. Browne, 2 Hutchinson Papers 1-15 (Prince Society ed., 1865); Plucknett,
supra note 142, at 60-63.
166 Rubin v. Hardaway, 1 Jeff. 109, 114 (Va. 1772). The plaintiffs also cited Day u Savadge,
Hobart 85, 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 236-37 (K.B. 1615), in which Hobart had followed Coke.
167
 See KENNETH UMBREIT, OUR ELEVEN CHIEF JUSTICES 120 (1938).
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master, in both meanings of this word: areas which the judge must
understand and areas which the judge may control. If the judge may
rightfully interpret doctrine and weigh the merits of custom, the judge
may just as rightfully review legislative enactments.
The artifice with which the judges reasoned drew on the rhetori-
cians' figures and techtiiques. Beyond that, Coke's theory of law as
artificial reason reflects a broader aspect of the rhetorical tradition.
The rhetoricians taught that the wisest, soundest, most public-spirited
argument would also be the most persuasive one. What was good and
just would be persuasive. Coke's reasoning relies on the same equation.
What is good and just,. the judge (in his wisdom) is persuaded to
enforce as law. Conversely, when the judge encounters something that
is wrong or unjust, he is persuaded against it and strikes it down. That
is the essence of common-law adjudication, and that is the mainspring
of Bonham's Case.
"It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first
and determines the principle afterwards," wrote Oliver Wendell Hol-
mes. "Judges know how to decide a good deal sooner than they know
why."' 68 Holmes' aphorisms were never more penetrating than in their
teaching about this decision. To decide Bonham's Case, Coke did not
need a theory of natural law.' 69 He needed only to believe (as in fact
he did believe) that legal decisions by judges are likely to be sounder
than legal decisions enacted by legislatures: Judicial decisions are more
likely to be considered in greater depth, subtler and more flexible in
responding to the facts of individual cases and crafted with greater
professional skill.'"
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than command and obedience, the matching halves of
positivist jurisprudence, artificial reason emphasizes intelligence, re-
168 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, WS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS
65, 90 (Harry Shrives. ed., 1936).
1119 As Samuel Thorne wrote, Benham's Case introduces "an idea of some superior 'right' only
when read in the light of St. German's and Fortescuc's natural law." Thorne, supra note 148, at
550,
170 There is a tension, never explicitly resolved, between Coke's praise of Parliament as the
highest court in the realm and his belief that judges had the authority to correct statutes. The
point was considered in detail by Charles Howard McIlwain at the turn of the last century. See
generally CHARLES H. IvIch.wmx, Tina HIGH COURT Or PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY (1910).
McIlwain concluded that Coke saw no clear line between legislation and adjudication, so that
Parliament operated as the highest judicial court in the realm. If one wishes to believe that Coke
accorded first place to one of the two conflicting constitutional ideas, no better explication has
yet been offered.
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sponsibility and consensus. This vision of law is healthier than most.
As John Underwood Lewis has noted, in an insightful study of Coke's
jurisprudence:
[A] definition of law in terms of "reasonableness" is better
able than a voluntaristic one of giving a realistic account of
legal obligation. The proposition that a man ought to obey a
law because it directs him to do what is reasonable can readily
be seen to be more defensible than the view that his obliga-
tion flows from a sovereign will; for when the reason given
for obedience to a law is simply the ruler's wish that it be
obeyed, what ought to be done in the legal order comes to
be equated with what is enforceable. This is, of course, the
"bad man" theory of law; and while it may explain why bad
men do in fact obey laws, it cannot by itself explain why they
ought to. Nor, more importantly, can it explain why good men
obey them.' 72
The personification of artificial reason, the figure whom Coke
would trust to define the law most truly, is the learned, reflective,
experienced judge. This mythic figure best embodies the qualities
which Coke prizes—but it is equally important to note whom the
learned judge is not. The learned judge is not the law-giving mon-
arch, the figure who stands behind Justinian's Institutes or Hobbes'
Leviathan—the personification of command theories of law. To de-
fine law as the judges' wisdom pays scant attention to the argument
that law represents the commands of the sovereign. Under Coke's
theory of artificial reason, the law exists and the state runs smoothly,
without the need for a king. This was a revolutionary concept in
Coke's era. It would grow more overtly revolutionary during the
century which opened with the publication of Coke's Reports. Coke
dethroned the monarch only in the realm of law. The Long Parlia-
ment, whose members voted to publish Coke's Institutei on the same
day that they watched the beheading of the Earl of Strafford, would
carry matters much farther.' 72
The archetype of the learned judge stands in sharp contrast to
another figure who casts a long shadow across the law: the worldly
machiavel who defines law in the realm of positivist jurisprudence, the
"bad man" (as Oliver Wendell Holmes put it) who cares only about
171 Lewis, supra note 92, at 342.
172 See C.V. WEnGwooD, TICE KING'S PEACE 1637-41 430 (1955).
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what the courts will do in fact.'" The bad man's part is a negative one.
He does not care to comprehend the law; he seeks to evade it. He seeks
to forecast or react to individual decisions; he does not care to inte-
grate the action of the law with the life of the society. This means that
he cannot shape the law as it evolves across a series of decisions.
This limited and reactive viewpoint is the opposite of Coke's vision
of law. As a way of defining law, artificial reason knowingly sets an
elevated standard. It is framed on the idea of duty and intelligence—
understanding of what is right and just, awareness of how to protect
the good and censure the wrong. It relies on initiative, will prompt and
ready, as Coke put it. Positivism offers a jurisprudence for those who
fear the law and want to evade it. It is a jurisprudence for rulers and
subjects. Artificial reason, by contrast, is a jurisprudence for citizens.
1 " See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 77te Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173
(1920).
